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ARTICLE
TOWARD A DUTY-BASED THEORY OF
EXECUTIVE POWER
David M. Driesen *
This article develops a duty-based theory of executive power. This
theory maintains that the Constitution seeks to instill a duty in all executive
branch officers to faithfully execute the law. Conversely, the Constitution's
Framers and Ratifiers did not intend to empower the President to
distinctively shape the law to suit his policy preferences or those of his
party. Rather, they envisioned a model of "disinterested leadership"
serving rule-of-law values. Because of the Ratifiers' and Framers' interest
in preventing abuse of executive power, the Constitution obligates executive
branch officials to disobey illegal presidential directives and creates a
major congressional role in preventing illegal executive action, primarily
by assigning the Senate a major role in appointments and removal.
The duty-based theory fits original intent better than the unitary
executive theory popular these days among originalists. Both the
constitutional text and the pre-enactment history show a preoccupation with
establishing duties, preventing real abuse, and securing stable
administration, rather than an effort to establish presidential control over
executive branch discretion. The duty-based theory also serves rule-of-law
values better than the unitary executive theory. This article closes with a
discussion of the theory's implications for key separation of powers issues
involving the execution of law.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article develops a duty-based theory of executive power. ' This
theory conceives of the U.S. Constitution as an effort to establish a rule of
law, rather than a reign of presidential personality. 2 As part of this effort,
the Constitution imposes a duty upon the President and all other executive
branch officials to obey the law, 3 relying upon a variety of approaches to
encourage compliance. It seeks to instill allegiance to the law in all
executive branch officials, provides for significant congressional and
judicial control over the executive branch, and envisions principled but
vigorous presidential leadership.
1. See generally David M. Driesen, Firing U.S. Attorneys, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707
(2008) (providing a brief preliminary sketch of the theory developed and fleshed out more
fully here).
2. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (linking the
"proud boast of our democracy that we have 'a government of laws and not of men' to the
principle of separation of powers (quoting MASS. CONST. Pt. I, art. XXX)); GLENN A.
PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 124-25 (1993)
(describing the founding generation's commitment to the rule of law as including the
concept that the law "bound lawmakers and citizens equally"); 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 318-19 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (recounting an argument
against the New Jersey plan as failing to remedy the law's "impotence" under the Articles of
Confederation); 2 id. at 64-65 (arguing that the President should be impeachable because no
man should be "above Justice"). See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW:
HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004).
3. See PHELPS, supra note 2, at 125 (describing this commitment to law governing the
government as distinguishing a Republic from monarchy).
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An emphasis on presidential duty fits the relatively modest conception of
the "Chief Magistrate['s] '' 4 political role prevailing at the founding, for the
Framers expected the President generally to cede policy-making authority
to Congress and to dutifully execute, rather than distinctively shape, the
law. 5 The modem notion of a President and his faction using his political
"preferences" 6 to mold the law was utterly foreign to the Framers, even
though they did understand that legal administration requires some
discretionary judgment. 7 While historians have recognized Republican
ideology's concept of "disinterested leadership" as a consensus view at the
founding,8 contemporary legal scholars have not explored this concept's
implications for executive power theories.
This Article offers a fresh bottom-up perspective on the very old debate
over executive power. Its explanation of how the Constitution creates
duties in lower executive branch officials as a check on presidential abuse
of power constitutes one of this Article's most distinctive contributions to
that debate. 9  While other commentators have recognized that lower
executive branch officials usefully check presidential decision making,' 0
they have not hitherto recognized that this check forms part of the Framers'
design.
The duty-based theory provides an alternative to the unitary executive
theory of presidential power. Unitarians (proponents of the unitary
executive theory) claim that the Constitution gives the President complete
control over all executive branch decisions. The duty-based theory, by
contrast, insists that the Constitution denies the President complete control
over the executive branch of government in order to assure fidelity to law.
4. Id. at 141.
5. See, e.g., id. at 150-54 (discussing George Washington's practice of not vetoing
domestic measures he disagreed with).
6. Id. at 141.
7. See, e.g., id. at 81 (explaining that the idea of competing notions of the public
interest appeared nonsensical to Washington, since he believed in a single public interest that
all virtuous men would endorse); William J. Kelleher, The Original Intentions of the Framers
for US Presidential Elections (Dec. 18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317837 (discussing the Framers' abhorrence of faction and how
they structured presidential elections to avoid it).
8. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 165 (2002)
(discussing the Framers' "vision of disinterested leadership").
9. Cf M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 603, 651 (2001) (describing the fragmentation of power within
branches of government as "our assurance against threatening concentrations of government
power").
10. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on
Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1560-62 (2007) (describing the U.S. Congress and
the courts as "[tihe most obvious checks on the President" but identifying "legal advisors
within the executive branch" as an "underappreciated" source of constraint); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316-17 (2006) (presenting use of bureaucracies' ability to
check executive branch abuse as a functional proposal to compensate for the demise of the
equilibrium between the executive and legislative branches that the Framers sought to
achieve).
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The unitary executive theory can, at times, undermine the rule of law in
favor of a rule of presidential personality. " I Thus, belief in a version of the
unitary executive theory encouraged the President, the Vice President, and
several executive branch lawyers to support illegal torture, wiretapping, and
procedures for prosecuting "enemy combatants."' 12 The duty-based theory,
by contrast, aims to resurrect a robust rule of law. 13
The Constitution's text, I will argue, supports the duty-based theory
presented here. This textualism is important, because the unitary executive
theory's allure stems largely from its claim of fidelity to constitutional
text. 14 By focusing heavily on text, I hope to more directly engage the core
of the argument for the unitary executive position. Proponents and
opponents of the unitary executive theory often speak past each other,
because proponents of the theory tend to emphasize text and original intent
11. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 85 (2007) (discussing the Cheney-Addington view of the unitary
executive theory as prohibiting congressional interference with presidential decisions during
wartime); Robert D. Sloane, The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century: An
Introduction, 88 B.U. L. REV. 341, 344 (2008) (characterizing a new unitary executive theory
as a basis for "a view of the scope of the executive power that is unprecedented in its
breadth"). Of course, the "cult of personality" has its roots in the tradition of electing
Presidents. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633,
657-60 (2000) (associating the cult of personality with presidential elections). But the
unitary executive theory, by strengthening the Presidency, enhances the influence of this cult
of personality.
12. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND
THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 49-50, 124-27, 130-39, 146-50, 153-56, 177-
81, 240, 271-73 (2008) (describing how the Bush-Cheney team's "new and improved
Unitary Executive Theory" led these actors to believe that the Commander-in-Chief could
properly carry out these illegal actions); Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA
Surveillance and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REv. 375, 383-84 (2008) (describing the link
between the Department of Justice (DOJ) memorandum justifying illegal wiretapping and
the "Vesting Clause thesis"); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613, 625 (2006)
(holding that the military commission's procedures violated the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and the Geneva Conventions); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-38 (2004)
(holding that a U.S. citizen accused of being an enemy combatant was unconstitutionally
denied a fair hearing and notice of the factual basis for allegations against him); ACLU v.
Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev'd and vacated on other
grounds, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1334 (2008) (holding that the
warrantless wiretapping program violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the
Fourth Amendment). In order to make this Article manageable, this Article will not examine
the relationship between the unitary executive theory and inherent presidential power to
address terrorism. Cf SAVAGE, supra note 12, at 124-27 (discussing the relationship in broad
outline).
13. See United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342)
(reading the Take Care Clause as establishing a duty to obey the law and therefore declining
to allow the President's approval of military action to justify a private violation of the
Neutrality Act). But see Lawson, supra note 12, at 376 (identifying the view of the Article II
Vesting Clause as a power grant as crucial to justifying wiretapping without the warrants
required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act).
14. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(claiming that the text of Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 requires that the President must have
"all of the executive power"); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's
Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550-56 (1994) (claiming that constitutional
text supports the unitary executive theory and arguing for text's "primacy").
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while most of the theory's critics emphasize functional considerations and
the actual practice of government. 15 This Article builds on and adds to
previous scholars' textualist critiques, but its textual analysis supports a
competing vision of executive power, not just a critique of the unitary
executive theory.' 6 Although this duty-based theory relies primarily upon
the Constitution's text, this presentation of the theory will also examine
non-textual evidence of original intent, case law, and functional factors. 17
The historical analysis presented here emphasizes pre-enactment history,
15. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1170 (1992) (claiming that non-
unitarians offer functionalist theories instead of the "formal power grant construction" that
unitarians rely upon). But see M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of
Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1137-38 (2000) (describing the "unitary executive"
debate as "dominated by constitutional-text parsing and dueling accounts of the original
understanding"). Compare Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 551-56 (arguing for text's
"primacy"), with Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an
Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 275 (1993) (focusing on the
role of political actors in defining the unitariness of executive branch legal interpretations),
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 17-32 (1994) (relying heavily upon lessons drawn from practice in the early
Republic), Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer] (focusing heavily on
constitutional practice, including contemporary practice), and Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
573, 581 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, Agencies] (assuming that "any useful legal analysis...
must" largely "accept" existing "reality").
16. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State:
The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 967-69 (2001) (providing a brief textualist
argument for limited presidential power); Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of
Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 799-801 (1987) (same). Professors
Cass Sunstein and Lawrence Lessig offer an important theory, but it does not so much
compete with the unitary executive theory as narrow and reshape it. See Lessig & Sunstein,
supra note 15, at 4 (rejecting the conclusion that the unitary executive theory properly
reaches "all administration of the laws"). They characterize the original understanding of the
scope of executive power as narrower than today's understanding. Id. at 12-78 (developing a
distinction between executive and administrative functions). And they also argue that the
broad modem theory might be right, but based on functional rather than historical
considerations. See id. at 2-3 (rejecting the claim that the Framers intended to require
presidential control over all government officials implementing law, but finding that modern
circumstances provide a "compelling nonhistorical argument" for the unitary executive
(citation omitted)). Nevertheless, Lessig and Sunstein offer a very significant argument.
Accord Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 545 (characterizing Lessig and Sunstein's
work as "seminal").
17. I choose to focus primarily on original intent in order to more squarely meet the
contentions of proponents of the unitary executive theory but do not take a position here on
the validity of original intent approaches, which has generated a vast literature. See, e.g.,
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990) (insisting on original intent's primacy);
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988); JACK N.
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1996); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 885 (1985) (arguing that the Framers did not intend that their intent would govern
future construction of the Constitution).
2009]
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
which has heretofore played a very limited role in the contemporary debate
on these issues. 18
This Article begins with a discussion of the unitary executive theory. It
then develops and justifies the duty-based alternative. Finally, it examines
some of the duty-based theory's implications for existing law.
I. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY
Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent in Morrison v. Olson 19 provides the
leading judicial articulation of the unitary executive theory. The Morrison
majority upheld provisions of the Ethics in Government Act (Act) 20
creating an independent counsel to investigate and prosecute high-ranking
officials' crimes. 2 1  In order to prevent presidential interference with
independent counsel investigation and prosecution, Congress lodged the
authority to appoint an independent counsel in the judiciary and only
authorized the Attorney General to remove him for "'good cause.' ' 22
While the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Act's removal and appointment
provisions,23 Justice Scalia dissented on the grounds that these provisions
interfered with presidential control over the executive branch of
government.24
Justice Scalia's dissent relied on the proposition that the President
possesses "all" executive power under the Constitution. 25 This idea, Scalia
argues, stems from the Vesting Clause, Article II, Section 1, Clause 1,
which provides, "'The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States."' 2 6  Since the statute "deprive[s] the President . . . of
exclusive control over the exercise" of a "purely executive power" (namely
prosecution), argued Scalia, it conflicts with the Framers' decision to give
the President "all" executive power. 27 This statement treats the Vesting
Clause's grant of "executive power" as a grant of "exclusive control,"
thereby implying that the President does not share control of the executive
branch with Congress or other federal officials.
Justice Scalia equates control with the power to appoint and remove
executive branch officials. 28 For Scalia, the President's ability, through the
18. See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 35 (2008) (devoting half of a sentence to
the pre-enactment history of removal).
19. 487 U.S. at 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (Supp. V
1982)). This provision has since expired.
21. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659-60.
22. Id. at 660-65 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)) (describing these provisions in detail).
23. Id. at 670-97.
24. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. Id. (describing Article II, Section 1, Clause I as lodging "all of the executive power"
in the President).
26. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1).
27. Id.
28. With respect to removal, Justice Antonin Scalia states that the "principle that the
President had to be the repository of all executive power ... necessarily means that he must
[Vol. 78
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Attorney General, to remove the Prosecutor for cause does not suffice; the
President must have the ability to remove without cause.2 9 He strongly
suggests that presidential control implies rejection of "'an attitude of
independence against the [President's] will"' among officers of the
executive branch of government in favor of a system where all hold their
office only if their conduct pleases the President. 30 In other words, he
equates control over the executive branch of government with the power to
fire all of those carrying out executive duties for any reason or no reason
whatsoever. Likewise, Justice Scalia finds the inability of the President,
through the Attorney General, to exercise control over the appointment of
the independent counsel inconsistent with presidential control over the
executive branch. 3'
I shall refer to the idea that presidential control over the executive branch
implies presidential control over appointment and removal as the
"patronage state theory." 32 While this term highlights the possibility that
presidential control can be used to advance a faction's interest, a chief
concern of the Framers, I do not mean to deny that Presidents can use their
power to serve rule-of-law values instead. This Article will later contrast
the patronage state theory with the duty-based theory's narrower conception
be able to discharge those who do not perform executive functions according to his liking."
Id. at 726 (citing Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1935)). With
respect to appointment, see infra note 31.
29. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining why good cause
removal does not amount to complete control).
30. Id. (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 629). Justice Scalia implies this through
his argument that "good cause" removal provisions limit the removal power. See id. at 706-
07. He points out that a person who can only be removed for good cause does not serve at
the President's pleasure. Id. at 707. Indeed, the purpose of a good cause removal provision
is to allow the person protected by it to "'maintain an attitude of independence against the
latter's will."' Id. (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 629). By rejecting good cause
removal, Scalia implicitly rejects executive branch independence from presidential will.
31. See id. at 701-03, 707 (criticizing the appointment provisions because they "severely
confine[]" the Attorney General's ability to refuse appointment of an independent counsel).
Justice Scalia also emphasizes the separation of powers principle that each department must
have "'defense . . . commensurate to the danger of attack."' Id. at 704 (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). Justice Scalia
applies this principle to the executive branch, which he sees as under attack in Morrison v.
Olson. See id. at 703 (criticizing the statute for commencing investigations without the
assent of the "President or his authorized subordinates"). He identifies the constitutional
need to defend the executive branch as giving "comprehensible content to the Appointments
Clause." Id. at 704. And this content leads him to reject the majority's decision to uphold
judicial appointment of the independent counsel. See id. at 713.
32. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926) (explaining that congressional
opposition to a custom or presidential removal arose in response to the "use of patronage for
political purposes"); HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 408-09 (2006) (describing President Andrew Jackson's
introduction of the policy of wholesale removal of holdover appointees as an innovation
justified as serving democracy that soon "degenerated into a spoils system of patronage and
cronyism"); cf John Yoo, Jefferson and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 425-26
(2008) (citing Thomas Jefferson's introduction of the spoils system-the practice of
rewarding supporters with offices in the government-as an effort to assert personal
presidential control over "all law enforcement").
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of the proper scope of presidential influence over the officials executing the
law. The patronage state theory constitutes a central element of the larger
theory of the unitary executive. 33
Justice Scalia justifies this control, in part, by endorsing a presidential
prerogative to make political decisions about prosecution. He describes
prosecutorial discretion as involving a balance of "legal, practical, and
political considerations." 34 Prosecutors must balance these factors, writes
Scalia, in deciding whether to prosecute "technical violation[s]" at all. 35
He then claims that the Constitution lodges control over prosecutorial
discretion, including decisions about when not to prosecute violations, in
the President. 36 Moreover, Justice Scalia envisions an executive branch
"attuned to the interests and the policies of the Presidency." 37
I will refer to this idea that the President must have exclusive control
over the politics of executive branch decision making as the unitary
executive theory's "political dimension." Notice that this political
dimension empowers the President to exercise more power than is strictly
necessary to assure faithful execution of the law. 38 In a situation in which
an executive branch official must choose between two actions, both of
which comply with the law, the "political dimension" insists that the sitting
President's political preference becomes the determining factor in making
the decision. 39
This political dimension of the unitary executive theory lies at the heart
of the unitary executive theory's tendency to undermine the rule of law.
This problem arises because the President and loyal subordinates may
support policies in considerable tension with the law they should
administer. The political dimension, the idea that the President's policy
preferences must govern administration, can lead to opportunistic
33. See CALABRES & Yoo, supra note 18, at 4 (characterizing presidential claims of
removal power as decisive evidence that Presidents "have believed in the theory of the
unitary executive").
34. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (describing the
balancing of these factors as "the very essence of prosecutorial discretion").
35. Id.
36. Id. at 708-09 (stating that taking control of this balancing from the President
"remove[s] the core of the prosecutorial function" from "[p]residential control"); accord
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 209-10 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the President's duty to faithfully execute the law requires him to
be able to decide to refrain from prosecuting violators of environmental statutes); cf
Johnsen, supra note 10, at 1594-95 (explaining that nonenforcement of statutes can
undermine the rule of law).
37. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 712 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 624 (1823) (recognizing that an officer honestly
exercising discretion within statutory bounds faithfully executes law); cf U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3 (requiring the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed").
39. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers
and the President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 992 (1993) (opining that
whenever a statute grants an executive branch official discretion, the Constitution authorizes
the President to "control that discretion").
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construction of the law, which can distort it.40 While neither Justice Scalia
nor the leading academic proponents of the unitary executive theory
endorse perversion of statutes, the political dimension of the unitary
executive theory can significantly undermine the rule of law.
The Court has rejected the unitary executive theory on numerous
occasions. 41 Yet, the rejected theory has profoundly influenced executive
branch conduct, much of it either unreviewable judicially or reviewable
only in a very deferential sense. 42 And recent appointments to the Court
may make it more receptive to the theory in the future.43 In the meantime,
Justice Scalia's dissent rekindled academic debate about the theory.44
40. Accord EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, 80-
81 (N.Y. Univ. Press 1957) (1940) (opining that allowing the President to substitute his own
judgment for that of any agency would convert all law enforcement questions into
discretionary questions controlled by "an independent and legally uncontrollable branch of
the government"); see, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 12 (detailing numerous instances where the
Bush administration distorted law in order to enhance the President's power and carry out a
militant policy to counter terrorism).
41. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690 n.29 (rejecting the dissent's view that blanket
executive removal authority can be inferred from the Article II Vesting Clause); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 738-39 & nn.1-3 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (approving of the
majority's decision not to endorse the theory that all executive officers must be subject to
presidential removal at will); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1958)
(upholding a congressional decision to insulate a War Claims Commission from presidential
control); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1935) (rejecting an
illimitable power of the President to remove officers carrying out quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial functions); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 484-85 (1886) (expressing "no
doubt" that Congress may prohibit the President from removing inferior officers); Kendall v.
United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838) (holding that when the Congress imposes a
duty upon an executive officer, the law, rather than the President, controls the exercise of
that duty).
42. See SAVAGE, supra note 12 (offering an exhaustive account of the role of the unitary
executive theory in executive branch decision making); Devins, supra note 15, at 273
(stating that "perceptions about unitariness define White House control of the administrative
state").
43. See SAVAGE, supra note 12, at 254, 271 (noting Justices John Roberts and Samuel
Alito's support for expanding executive power prior to their elevation to the bench).
44. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 593-99 (describing the unitary
executive theory as demanding complete presidential control over all executive branch
officials and discussing required control mechanisms); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 15,
at 1186-208 (claiming that many arguments made about Article III support the unitary
executive theory of Article II); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive,
Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1022 (2007) (stating that the President can supervise and control
principal officers and veto any inferior officer's decision); A. Michael Froomkin, The
Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1346, 1348 (1994) (stating that
"unitarians" believe that the Constitution requires that the President have the power to
countermand and fire all executive branch officials); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the
Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the
Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62, 73 (1990) (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court
has recognized presidential removal authority in order to "preserve a unitary executive");
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 4 (characterizing the unitary executive theory as a
"myth"); Percival, supra note 16 (arguing against application of the unitary executive theory
to officials that have received delegated authority from Congress).
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Scholars supporting Justice Scalia's view have emphasized intertextual
considerations, 45 which the duty-based theory emphasizes as well. The
most important of these intertextual arguments for purposes of
understanding the duty-based alternative concerns the relationship between
the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause, which requires that the
President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. '46  These
scholars argue that in order to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed," 47 the President must control all officials administering law.48
Generally, unitary executive proponents support originalism, the idea that
the Constitution's Framers' intentions should govern the resolution of
contemporary constitutional questions. 49 Accordingly, Justice Scalia and
his academic supporters rely on the Framers' intent to help justify the
unitary executive theory. This history shows that the Framers specifically
rejected the notion of a committee heading the executive branch of
government in favor of a single executive, hence the phrase "unitary
executive. ' 50 These originalists have also attempted to bolster the case for
the unitary executive theory by looking at post-enactment practice. 51
Because both the early presidents and many of the members of the first
Congress were among those involved in ratifying the Constitution, their
actions may provide clues to the Framers' intentions. While unitarians
argue that the available evidence of Framers' intent both prior to and
subsequent to enactment of the Constitution supports their case, they argue
strenuously that text governs and that the Framers' intentions are only
relevant in helping resolve textual ambiguities. 52 The duty-based theory
relies heavily on text and only secondarily upon history, in keeping with
this approach.
II. THE DUTY-BASED THEORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER
This section begins with an elaboration of the duty-based theory's central
claims. It then discusses the relevant evidence for evaluating the theory's
soundness, beginning with constitutional text, and, with minor exceptions,
45. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 570-99 (discussing various
intertextual arguments).
46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
47. Id.
48. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 582-83.
49. See id. at 546 n. 11 (pointing out that originalists have tended to support the unitary
executive theory in recent years).
50. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 698-99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing the decision to vest the executive power in a single President as reflecting
deliberate rejection of proposals for multiple executives or a council of advisers); infra notes
162-65 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 635-62; Saikrishna Prakash, New
Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 1021, 1075 (2006) (arguing that the
congressional debates over the Decision of 1789 evinced majority support for a presidential
removal power).
52. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 550 (arguing that originalists only resort
to historical argument when an ambiguity exists).
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introducing history only later. Because of this Article's desire to focus
primarily upon original intent, most of the case law presentation occurs in
Part III as part of the discussion of the duty-based theory's implications for
existing law.
A. Duty's Primacy
The Constitution, as unitarians recognize, seeks to establish a rule of law
through a scheme of separated powers. 53 A rule of law implies that all
officials in the executive branch of government must obey the laws that
Congress enacts under the Constitution. Congress passes many laws with
the President's concurrence. But it passes some, as it were, over his dead
body, i.e., by overriding a veto.54 Whether the President likes the law or
not, the Founders wanted the President and all other executive branch
officials to obey it. 55
A central problem the Framers faced in designing the new government's
executive branch was how to configure government to encourage this
obedience to law. The Founders wished to check the natural tendency of
Presidents and other executive branch officials to act according to their own
personal or political preferences, but many of them feared making the
executive branch completely subject to congressional caprice as much as
others feared monarchy. The Founders were familiar with the idea of
allegiance to a person; English law had long required an oath swearing
allegiance to the King. 56 But they sought to establish something different,
allegiance to the law. 57
The Constitution addresses this need by explicitly creating duties
applicable to both the President and all other executive branch officials to
obey the law. These duties, as we shall see, require lower executive branch
officials to disobey illegal presidential orders in order to allow them to
check presidential abuse. 58
53. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (identifying the rule of law
with separation of powers).
54. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (authorizing two-thirds of the Congress to override a
presidential veto).
55. See generally WALTER E. DELLINGER ET AL., PRINCIPLES To GUIDE THE OFFICE OF
LEGAL COUNSEL (2004), reprinted in Johnsen, supra note 10, at app. 2, at 1604 (discussing
the President's "constitutional obligation to ensure the legality of executive action");
Ackerman, supra note 11, at 712 (suggesting that the President's role in lawmaking conflicts
with his duty to take care that the law be faithfully executed).
56. See generally Enid Campbell, Oaths and Affirmations of Public Office Under
English Law: An Historical Retrospect, J. LEGAL HIST., Dec. 2000, at 1 (detailing the history
of oath taking in England).
57. Cf Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1, 18 (1984)
(explaining that the Oath Clause aimed to establish allegiance to the Constitution in much
the same way that religious oaths sought to establish allegiance to a church).
58. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 171 (1803) (stating that the
President may not lawfully forbid an executive officer from carrying out acts required by
law).
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The Constitution reinforces the duty to obey law by dividing control over
the executive branch of government between the President and Congress.
Rather than create the patronage state, the Framers rejected the idea of
unilateral presidential control over appointment and removal, instead
adopting provisions providing for senatorial removal and substantial
congressional involvement in the appointment of officers. Indeed, a leading
proponent of executive power, Alexander Hamilton, specifically praised the
Constitution's decision to deny the President a removal power as a force for
stability in administration during the ratification debates. 59
The Constitution envisions presidential leadership and a dialogue
between somewhat independent officials and the President about
appropriate exercises of discretion within a rule-of-law framework. It does
not provide presidential power to completely control officials.
The Framers contemplated a much more modest role for presidential
power than exists today. The Founders did not view the President as a
major domestic policy maker, leaving that job to Congress. The utter lack
of originalist support for the political dimension of the unitary executive
theory fatally undermines the theory as a whole. 60 Since the President
never could execute all law himself or even personally direct each action
that other executive branch officials take, the unitary executive theory's
insistence on presidential control of the executive branch must be
understood as a metaphor. 6 1 Implicitly recognizing this, unitarians extend
the control metaphor by insisting on the President putting in place
subordinates, in Justice Scalia's words, "attuned to the interests and the
policies of the Presidency." 62 The Framers, however, did not expect the
President to act as a policy maker in executing the law and specifically
sought to check his ability to advance his own interests by denying him the
ability to select his subordinates without substantial legislative control.
They viewed Congress as the chief policy maker and viewed the President
as the "Chief Magistrate," i.e., as the principal officer who must obey and
properly carry out the law. 63
We shall see that the text and contemporaneous history powerfully
support the duty-based theory. The provisions most directly speaking to the
relationship between the executive branch and lower government officials
embrace duty and reject unilateral presidential control over the executive
59. See infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
60. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who
Would Distort and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive, by Steven G. Calabresi
and Christopher Yoo, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (book review) (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript
at 3, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (describing the unitary executive theory as the
"belief.. . that the Vesting Clause of Article II confers on the President plenary power over
policy making by all Executive Branch... officials" (emphasis added)).
61. See Devins, supra note 15, at 275 (characterizing the administration as "too immense
for the White House... to comprehensively coordinate policy making").
62. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 712 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf Devins,
supra note 15, at 276 (explaining that a President can appoint "like-minded individuals" in
order to "place his imprimatur on governmental operations").
63. See, e.g., Phelps, supra note 2, at 140-41 (showing Washington adopted this view).
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branch, a reading confirmed unequivocally by the pre-ratification history.
Early post-enactment history reflects a consensus favoring the duty-based
theory and division on questions of presidential control. The text and
contemporaneous history together establish that the Ratifiers' intent favors
the duty-based theory and that contemporary unitary executive theory is a
non-originalist attempt to smuggle modem notions of expansive
presidential power into the Constitution.
B. Constitutional Text
A proper reading of the constitutional text requires consideration of the
whole text. Taken together, the text strongly supports the duty-based
theory.
1. Clauses Establishing Duties
The Constitution addresses the need to create a duty to obey the law in a
very straightforward manner-by imposing duties on the President and
other executive branch officials directed at securing fidelity to the law. The
text includes both a Take Care Clause and two Oath Clauses creating these
duties.
a. The Take Care Clause
The Take Care Clause establishes the first relevant presidential duty. It
requires the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 64
This clause does not require the President to execute the law himself, for
the simple reason that even in George Washington's time this was
impossible. 65  Accordingly, the Framers employed the passive voice,
implying that unnamed people other than the President would execute the
law. 66 Nor does the clause require the President to "assure" that these other
64. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
65. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (recognizing that the President
"alone and unaided" cannot execute the laws); 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 2, at 53-54 (affirming that the Executive "can do nothing of consequence"
without the "great" ministers of war, foreign affairs, etc.); see also, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw,
Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican
Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1667 (2007) (pointing out that because President
Jefferson "could not micromanage" enforcement of the embargo Congress imposed, the U.S.
Treasury Department provided much of the enforcement policy's content); Letter from
George Washington, U.S. President, to Eleanor Francois Elie, Conte de Mousier (May 25,
1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, JUNE 1788-JAN. 1790, at 333-34
(John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (acknowledging the "impossibility" of "one man" performing
"all the great business of the State" as the rationale for creating Departments and their
officers).
66. See BRUFF, supra note 32, at 455 (stating that the "passive mood" of the Take Care
Clause signals that the President superintends others' activities); Thomas 0. McGarity,
Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 465-66
(1987) (claiming that the Take Care Clause envisions others executing the law); Prakash,
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people faithfully implement the law. Instead, it more mildly admonishes
him to "take Care" that others execute the law properly. The choice of the
Take Care Clause's mild admonishment over the language of control
suggests that the President must employ his best effort to encourage faithful
law execution, but acknowledges that he lacks the power to assure faithful
execution of the law himself.67
b. The Oath Clause
The Constitution supplements this effort to make the President into a
force for executive branch fidelity to law with a requirement of a
presidential oath. It requires him upon assuming office to promise to
"faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and.., to
the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States." 68  This Presidential Oath Clause suggests an effort to
employ the President's sense of honor and duty as an instrument in securing
fidelity to law. 69 This clause's existence suggests that the Framers believed
that a President who publicly promises to defend the Constitution is more
likely to do so. 70
Since the Constitution recognizes that executive branch officials other
than the President must implement the law, it seeks to secure their fidelity
to law as well. Importantly, in a break with the monarchial tradition of
fealty to an individual head of government, it does not try to secure their
personal loyalty to the President. Instead of requiring executive branch
officials to swear an oath pledging fealty to the President, the Constitution
requires "all executive . . . Officers . . . [to] be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution."' 7 1 This General Oath Clause
even more strongly suggests an effort to employ individual honor and duty,
this time in officials other than the President, as forces encouraging fidelity
supra note 39, at 993 (acknowledging that "[tihe Framers recognized that the President could
not enforce federal law alone").
67. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 624 (1823) (interpreting the Take Care Clause as
precluding the President from overturning a Treasury Department decision); cf Lear Siegler,
Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1120-26 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the duty to
faithfully execute the law does not include a power to decline to enforce valid statutes);
BRUFF, supra note 32, at 456 (approving an Attorney General Opinion saying that the
President could order a federal prosecutor to dismiss a case with foreign affairs implications,
because the President "makes our foreign policy"); Strauss, Agencies, supra note 15, at 648-
50 (finding the clause consistent with vesting decision-making authority in adninistrative
agencies).
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
69. See Grey, supra note 57, at 18 (describing the oath clause as a "ritual of allegiance"
substituting for a religious oath); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1837, at 702 (1833) (finding that the oath imposed "solemn
obligation[s] . . . especially upon those . . . who fe[lt] a deep sense of accountability to"
God).
70. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 31, at 177
(stating that the "sanctity" of the oath will bind all officers to obey federal law).
71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. This Oath Clause applies not only to "all executive ...
Officers ... of the United States," but also to all state and federal officials. Id.
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to the law. 72 It explicitly views the required promise of allegiance to the
Constitution as binding the official making the oath or affirmation.
It remains to spell out the implications of these duties to the Constitution.
The presidential duty to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution" 73
has a lot in common with the other officials' duty to "support" the
Constitution. 74 The notion of protecting and supporting a Constitution both
imply an obligation to obey it. The Constitution needs support and
protection in the sense of obedience, so that it can establish a rule of law.
Thus, these oaths create duties for all executive branch officials to obey the
Constitution.
Obviously, this obedience duty prevents executive branch officials from
trampling upon rights established in the Constitution. Thus, for example,
an officer who swears such an oath should feel duty bound not to take
property of citizens without just compensation and due process, for the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits such actions. 75 But this
obedience duty is broader than just the duty to avoid trampling on
constitutional rights. For the Constitution also establishes the process for
making and implementing the law. The obligation to uphold these parts of
the Constitution imply an obligation to comply with laws enacted under the
Constitution. 76
Accordingly, the General Oath Clause requires federal officials to
disobey the President when he orders them to violate the law. 77 To that
72. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 551
(recounting Gouverneur Morris's statement supporting allowing the Senate to impeach a
President for a misdemeanor because "there could be no danger that the Senate would say
untruly on their oaths that the President was guilty of crimes").
73. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
74. Accord DAVID WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY
APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 910 (1910) (quoting Thomas Jefferson as stating that the
presidential oath substantively replicated the general oath).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
76. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924-25, 943 (1997) (majority and
dissenting opinions) (recognizing that the General Oath Clause requires officials to
implement constitutional federal statutes); accord Dawn E. Johnsen, What's a President To
Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L.
REv. 395, 412-14 (2008) (explaining why the President's duty to "'preserve, protect and
defend' the Constitution requires him to enforce statutes properly, unless they blatantly
violate the Constitution under Supreme Court precedent (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
8)). Professor Saikrishna Prakash points out that the General Oath Clause, unlike the
Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, does not explicitly mention federal law. See
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1992-93
(1993). Yet, the Framers and the Anti-Federalists clearly understood the oath as binding
state officials to enforce federal statutes. See THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton),
supra note 31, at 177 (explaining that the oath, by binding all state and federal officials helps
make federal law supreme); Letter of Agrippa V, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 11, 1787, reprinted
in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 78 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). The General Oath
Clause applies to both state and federal officials, so if it requires state officials to enforce
federal law, it must bind federal officials in that way as well.
77. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 625 (1823) (opining that when a statute delegates power
to a department head, the President's duty to faithfully execute the law precludes his
interference with that officer's decision).
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extent, at least, the Constitution rejects presidential control over the
executive branch of government, setting up individuals within the executive
branch of government as checks on presidential abuse. 78  This is a
necessary implication of a clause that requires fidelity to the law, rather
than fidelity to the President. 79
This implication of the Oath Clause has enormous contemporary
relevance. For example, a key Justice Department official, relying on his
Oath of Office, opposed administration efforts to authorize torture, in
contravention of treaties, which constitute binding laws in the United States
under the Constitution. 80 Lawyers who believed that their primary loyalty
belonged with the law, rather than with the President or Vice President,
have moderated some recent abuses. Fidelity to the law triggered a threat of
mass resignations, leading President Bush to narrow his illegal wiretapping
program, and oath-based opposition, at least briefly, checked broad
authorization of torture. 81 The General Oath Clause aims to encourage
these sorts of checks upon presidential abuse of power.
The Presidential Oath Clause affirms the President's lack of control over
executive officers, while simultaneously emphasizing the President's
broader responsibilities to the Constitution. While other officeholders need
merely pledge their "support" for the Constitution, the President must
promise to "preserve, protect and defend" it. 82 This locution includes a
duty to obey the Constitution, but it implies a broader duty to try to prevent
others from undermining it through maladministration of the law. Thus, the
Presidential Oath Clause reinforces the Take Care Clause, in effect
requiring the President to take a public oath that he will carry out the duty
established in the Take Care Clause. 83
78. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 41-42 (explaining that by claiming that the
Geneva Convention protects Iraqi terrorists even though David Addington insisted that the
President's contrary decision not be questioned, the Office of Legal Counsel acted as a
"frontline policymaker in the war on terrorism").
79. See id. at 79-80 (recounting FBI Director Bob Mueller's explanation of "why he felt
obliged to follow an OLC legal opinion even if the President disagreed").
80. See, e.g., id. at 11 (explaining that the author decided to "fix" defective memoranda
authorizing counterterrorism operations, because doing so "was more consistent with my
oath of office" than resigning).
8 1. See id. (suggesting that concerns about violating his oath led to his efforts to narrow
torture memos); SAVAGE, supra note 12, at 184-88 (explaining how President George W.
Bush authorized a narrowing of the warrantless wiretapping program, apparently to avoid
resignations of officials who doubted its legality); see also David Luban, Lawfare and Legal
Ethics in Guantcinamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 2000-02 (2008) (describing JAGs as
"stubborn rule of law defenders" against torture memos predicated on the unitary executive
theory); Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2008, at 40,
42 (explaining that the employee blowing the whistle on warrantless wiretapping did so
because he "'had taken an oath to uphold the Constitution"' (quoting Thomas Tamm)).
82. Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3, with id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
83. A proposal from the Committee on Detail shows how closely related these two
clauses were in the eyes of their drafters: "(He shall take Care to the best of his Ability, that
the Laws) <It shall be his duty to provide for the due & faithful exec-of the Laws> of the
United States (be faithfully executed) <to the best of his ability>." 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 171.
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The Presidential Oath Clause, however, only requires the President to
"preserve, protect and defend the Constitution" "to the best of [his]
Ability."'8 4 In addition to exhorting the President to make his best efforts,
this ability limitation acknowledges that the President cannot prevent all
abuses, because he cannot control all law execution himself. This ability
phrase contrasts with the part of the oath wherein the President promises to
"faithfully execute the Office of President."'8 5 The ability limitation does
not apply to this part of the oath. This contrast signals an understanding
that the President can wholly control his own exercise of authority, but not
that of others. Thus, the Take Care Clause creates a broad presidential duty
while recognizing limits to presidential control over executive branch
officials.
2. Clauses Rejecting the Patronage State and Embracing Shared Power
over the Executive Branch
While the Constitution seeks to instill a duty to uphold the Constitution
among officeholders directly, through announcement of duties and the
swearing of oaths, it reflects a recognition that this might not suffice.
Accordingly, the Constitution established significant elements of
congressional control over the executive branch of government. This is in
keeping with general philosophy of separation of powers, that "[a]mbition
must be made to [check] ambition."8 6 Congressional ambitions for law
enforcement would check potential presidential abuse and help secure
executive branch fidelity to the law.
The Constitution does not establish the patronage state favored by
unitarians. The text denies the President complete control over appointment
and removal of executive branch officials. The Framers understood that the
power to appoint carries with it the ability to create a sense of obligation
among officeholders, which would serve as a source of presidential
control.8 7 Similarly, the ability to remove an officer would serve the aim of
presidential control over executive branch officials. Yet, the Constitution
only gives the President limited control over appointments and contains not
a single word authorizing the President to remove executive branch officials
from their offices under any circumstances. 88
a. The Appointments Clause
The Appointments Clause authorizes the Senate to reject presidential
nominations of high executive branch officials. It empowers the President
84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
85. Id.
86. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 31, at 322.
87. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (showing an understanding that
unilateral presidential control of appointments would lead to appointment of quislings).
88. See CALABRESI & Yoo, supra note 18, at 4 (characterizing the removal power as an
"implied" power).
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to nominate "Officers of the United States," but only to appoint them "with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate." 89 The Senate can use this power to
reject presidential favorites not likely to faithfully carry out the laws the
Senate helps enact. 90 This means that the highest ranking officials, while
surely feeling some loyalty to the President who nominates them, also owe
their appointment to U.S. Senators. The Appointments Clause also allows
the Congress to take the appointment of "inferior Officers" away from the
President entirely by expressly authorizing Congress to vest the
appointments power in Article III judges, 91 who have life tenure and may
have been appointed by a political opponent of a sitting President. This
congressional authority to vest judges with an appointment power figured
prominently in Morrison, which adjudicated, among other things, the
constitutionality of an Ethics in Government Act provision that lodged the
power to appoint an independent counsel in a panel of Article III judges. 92
The Court upheld this provision, relying on the language authorizing
Congress to delegate appointment authority to judges. 93 The Appointments
Clause also authorizes the vesting of the authority to appoint inferior
officers in the President or heads of departments, but it leaves Congress
with the choice of whether to allow for direct presidential control
(presidential appointment), the possibility of presidential influence (heads
of departments), or no presidential control at all (the judiciary). 94 The
provision authorizing Congress to control who gets to appoint inferior
officers allows Congress to lodge the appointment power in the person most
likely to hire inferior officers who will faithfully execute the law. 95 This
clause shows that the Constitution does not give the President complete
control over the executive branch of government, thereby undermining the
unitary executive theory.96
89. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
90. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (per curiam) (describing the
Senate as "a participant in the appointive process by virtue of its authority to refuse to
confirm" the President's nominees).
91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
92. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671-77 (1988) (explaining why 28 U.S.C. §
594(a) does not violate the Appointments Clause when it provides for judicial appointment
of an independent counsel (citing 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (Supp. V 1982)).
93. See id. at 673-77 (rejecting an argument against interbranch appointments, primarily
because the Appointments Clause expressly authorizes Congress to vest the appointment of
"inferior officers" in the courts).
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 673 (stating that the
Appointments Clause gives Congress "significant discretion" in choosing where it wants to
vest the authority to appoint inferior officers).
95. Cf Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1879) (affirming Congress's discretionary
authority to choose the locus of the appointment power, but suggesting that Congress should
favor the department of government in which the official is to be located).
96. Accord Froomkin, supra note 16, at 799; see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 674-75 (noting
that the Framers rejected attempts to transfer the authority to appoint inferior officers to the
President); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 1181 (recognizing that the Inferior
Officers Clause both curtails the President's appointment power and recognizes "Heads of
Departments" as having a place in the constitutional design).
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b. The Removal Clause
The Constitution's text provides for congressional control over the
removal of officers and contains not a word authorizing presidential
removal for any reason. More specifically, it provides for removal from
office of "civil Officers of the United States ... on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." 97 Thus, it authorizes removal for the kind of corruption
that the Framers viewed as the greatest threat to the rule of law. 98 The
Constitution assigns the Senate the duty to try impeachments and requires a
two-thirds vote in order to convict an impeached officer. 99 The Framers'
debates about Article II focus heavily upon concerns about abuse of
power. '00 They decided that somebody must control executive officers in
cases of abuse. They chose not the President, but the Senate, to perform
this function of controlling executive branch officials.
The Removal Clause sets out a "finely wrought" procedure' 0' for these
trials, requiring Senators "sitting" for the purpose of impeachment to "be on
Oath or Affirmation" and requiring the Chief Justice of the United States to
preside in the case of a presidential impeachment. 102 Furthermore, the
Constitution specifies impeachment's consequences, namely, removal from
office and a bar on assuming any other office in the federal government. 103
It goes on to deny that impeachment has any other consequences, but
affirms that an impeached officeholder can be tried criminally in a regular
court for his offense. 104
Since the Constitution contains only a single "finely wrought" procedure
for removing executive branch officials from office, one might well infer
that this procedure is exclusive. Under this reading, the President may
never remove an officeholder prior to expiration of his term in office; only
the Senate can do that, through impeachment. And this is precisely the way
some of those who participated in framing the Constitution read it when this
subject arose during the First Congress, as Professors Steven Calabresi and
Saikrishna Prakash, both leading unitarians, admit. 105
97. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
98. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 65-66
(recounting James Madison's support for making the President impeachable, because he
might "pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or oppression[,] ... betray his
trust to foreign powers," or "lose his capacity").
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
100. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 17 (2000) (describing avoiding abuse of power
as the primary goal of the Appointments Clause debate).
101. Cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (treating the "finely wrought"
procedure of bicameralism and presentment explicitly set out in the Constitution as the
exclusive means of passing legislation).
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
103. Id.
104. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
105. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of William Smith)
(contending that the Constitution's impeachment provision implies that impeachment is the
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The modem Court, of course, has never prohibited Congress from adding
removal procedures not specified in the Constitution. And Congress has
done so for a very long time.
Intertextual considerations do not support this tradition of allowing
Congress to supplement the Constitution's sole removal procedure. Article
III provides lifetime tenure for federal judges, absent impeachment. 106 The
failure of Article II to specify that executive branch officials likewise enjoy
lifetime tenure (absent impeachment) seems, at first glance, to make the
inference that Congress can provide for their removal by means other than
impeachment reasonable. 10 7  On the other hand, an assumption that
Congress has authority to limit executive branch officials' terms of office
but not to provide for removal prior to the expiration of a term except via
impeachment makes the Impeachment Clause's exclusivity consistent with
Article III. 108 Thus, the contrast with Article III provides no intertextual
support for the notion that Congress may supplement the Constitution's sole
explicit removal procedure.
Supplementing the Constitution with new removal provisions, however,
can make it possible to remove officeholders for failures not amounting to
high crimes and misdemeanors. For example, Congress could make
consistent failure to implement a statute grounds for removal (and has often
done so). Removal procedures that allow this would serve rule-of-law
values at the heart of the duty-based theory, but enjoy no explicit textualist
support.
The Constitution's failure to explicitly provide for removal except in
cases of criminal misconduct shows, at a minimum, that the Framers did not
consider the authority to fire noncriminal officials sufficiently important to
the rule of law to explicitly authorize it in the Constitution. The
Constitution's language implies that a sense of honor and duty to the law
and gratitude to the many officials entitled to participate in appointments
would act as forces impelling officials to properly execute the law. In
addition, the possibility of judicial review, presidential cajoling, and
congressional oversight create additional pressures to secure faithful
execution of the law. Removal for noncriminal malfeasance, while
potentially useful in advancing the rule of law, may not be constitutionally
required, or even permissible under the constitutional text.
only "mode" of removal from office); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 642-43 (noting
that some in the First Congress supported the idea that impeachment was the sole
constitutionally permissible method of removing an officer); Gerhard Casper, An Essay in
Separation of Powers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211,234 (1989) (describing the position that
"[r]emoval was possible only by means of impeachment" as one of the major positions taken
in the 1789 debate over creation of departments in the executive branch of government).
106. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I (stating that "Judges ... shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour").
107. See Prakash, supra note 51, at 1035 (asking why the Framers would have specified
life tenure for judges if all officers could serve for life).
108. See id. at 1035 n.101 (suggesting a similar position).
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The Constitution's failure to explicitly provide for removal for
disobedience to the President also suggests that the Constitution does not
require the creation of a patronage state. If the Framers considered
presidential control over executive branch officials important, they did not
consider the ability to fire disobedient officials sufficiently essential to
maintaining this control to justify express inclusion of such a power in the
Constitution. Instead, the Constitution uses shared power and duty to
secure fidelity to law. Certainly, the Constitution's appointment and
removal provisions do not create the patronage state.
c. Vesting of Power in Departments
Both proponents and opponents of the unitary executive theory agree that
the Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to create executive
branch departments and offices and to assign them duties. 109 This clause
authorizes Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof."1 10 This language states that the
Constitution vests powers in departments and officers, not just the
President. I II This reading of the Article I Vesting Clause precludes reading
the Article II Vesting Clause as an exclusive grant of power. "12
109. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 592 (agreeing that the Necessary and
Proper Clause creates congressional authority to create executive offices and to assign duties
to carry out statutorily specified tasks); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 69 (interpreting
the Necessary and Proper Clause to allow Congress to "specify the means by which laws
were to be executed"); Strauss, Agencies, supra note 15, at 598-99 (inferring from the
paucity of the Constitution's description of the President's powers an intention to leave the
"job of creating" the federal government's shape to Congress under the Necessary and
Proper Clause); see also 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at
345 (showing that Madison and Charles Pinckney proposed to specifically provide that
Congress can "establish all offices," but that many members considered this as unnecessary,
as the power was clearly implied by the Necessary and Proper Clause); William W. Van
Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the
Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 102, 107, 118 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper
clause suggests limits on implied presidential power).
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
111. Accord Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838) (affirming
Congress's power to "impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper");
Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, 10 F. Cas. 355, 356 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5420)
(Congress may vest final decision-making authority in an inferior officer).
112. See Williams v. United States, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 290, 297 (1843) (declaring that the
President's duty to superintend administration "cannot require of him to become the
administrative officer of every department" lest he "absorb" the various departments'
duties); see also, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (affirming the
constitutionality of congressional creation of an independent national bank under the
Necessary and Proper Clause). Professors Steven Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes argue that the
Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes the creation of executive branch offices, but does
not authorize congressional delegation of executive power to such offices. Calabresi &
Rhodes, supra note 15, at 1184 n. 158. But this Vesting Clause states that the Constitution,
not the President, vests departments with powers. Since this Vesting Clause appears in
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The Opinions Clause confirms that department heads have responsibility
to execute the law. It empowers the President to "require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon
any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices." 113 Notice
that this clause confirms that department heads have duties. The Clause
undermines the idea that the Vesting Clause empowers the President to
fully control executive officers. If it did, there would be no need for a
clause giving the President power to get a written opinion from a cabinet
member. 114 The felt need for an explicit power grant to simply get a
written opinion suggests an expectation that department heads would
sometimes have substantial scope for independent operation.
Thus, the Constitution's removal provision (the Impeachment Clause),
the Appointments Clause, the Oath Clauses, the Necessary and Proper
Clause, and the Opinions Clause give non-presidential actors a role in
controlling the execution of government power. 115 Unitarians seek to
overcome the specifics in the directly relevant clauses, those that explicitly
address elements of control over the executive branch, by arguing that
complete presidential control must be implied from a more general clause,
namely the Vesting Clause. This approach contradicts the principle that
ordinarily provisions in a document directly bearing on a subject qualify
more general provisions. 116 In any case, we now turn to the Vesting
Clause, the textual linchpin of the unitary executive theory.
3. The Article II Vesting Clause
The proper interpretation of Article II's Vesting Clause accepts
presidential influence on behalf of the rule of law, but rejects the theory of
the patronage state. While it is plausible to read the Vesting Clause in
isolation as creating complete control, it is not plausible to read it that way
in light of all of the textual evidence that others also have a role in
controlling executive branch decisions. "17
conjunction with language in Article I authorizing Congress to create departments, this
Clause is best read as authorizing Congress to give the officers it creates specific powers.
113. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 1.
114. See THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 31, at 447
(characterizing the clause as "mere redundancy"); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 32-
36, 38 (providing elaboration of this basic point); Froomkin, supra note 16, at 800-01.
115. Indeed, a series of early Attorneys General opinions stated that when Congress
vested responsibility in a federal officer to perform a duty, the President may not make
relevant decisions in her stead. 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 28 (1869); 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 226 (1853); 4
Op. Att'y Gen. 515, 516 (1846); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 507 (1832); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 625
(1823). Contra Gilchrest, 10 F. Cas. at 357-59 (courts may not order an officer to disobey a
presidential order (citing Letter from Caesar A. Rodney, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Thomas
Jefferson, U.S. President (July 15, 1808))); 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 453, 469-70 (1855).
116. See Townsend v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512 (1883) (describing the rule that specific
provisions qualify general provisions as a "well settled rule").
117. See Froomkin, supra note 16, at 793 n.31 (claiming that the Vesting Clause derives
its meaning from the Constitution's "full text").
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Unitarians read the language vesting "the Executive power" with the
President as vesting "all" executive power with the President. Yet, the
word "all" comes from Justice Scalia's Morrison dissent, not from the
Constitution itself. The omission of the word "all" from Article II appears
deliberate. Article I vests in the Congress "All legislative Powers herein
granted.""18 By contrast, Article II vests in the President "the executive
Power."119 The omission reflects recognition of the President's inability to
exercise all of the executive power himself, so that others must execute the
law. The Vesting Clause gives the President very significant power, but
does not deny others an important role in executing the law. The
Constitution denies the President complete control over the executive
branch, precisely in order to assure that competing forces coalesce to foster
a rule of law, rather than allowing a single faction to capture the actual
implementation of law.
The President exercises executive power through legitimate requests
that lower ranking officials will generally honor.120 Their oath requires
them to support the Constitution. The Constitution provides for the election
of the President and gives him executive power. 121 They must, therefore,
carefully consider his requests in light of his political stature and his
executive power. 122 These provisions assure that executive branch officials
will generally honor legitimate requests involving the exercise of purely
executive power, even if no power to remove them existed. 123 But these
officials are also bound to support the Constitution themselves. Therefore,
they must refuse improper requests.
During most periods, this is precisely how government operates. 124 No
good organization relies heavily on threats of dismissal as a means of
assuring fidelity to its mission. 125 Instead, sound governance instills a
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
119. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
120. The duty-based vision of presidential execution through influence, rather than
complete control, closely tracks Peter Strauss's distinction between presidential execution
through oversight and performance. See generally Strauss, Overseer, supra note 15 (setting
out this conception and defending it at length).
121. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
122. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A
Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 501, 522 (2005)
(arguing that agencies should generally defer to presidential direction unless the directives
take them outside of their statutory authority); Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory
Powers To Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 263, 315 (2006) (arguing that agencies
should only reject presidential requests for "very good reasons").
123. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 36-39 (arguing that the Office of Legal Counsel
properly tilts toward the President's views in close cases and tries to serves its ends, while
affirming a duty to check illegal executive branch initiatives); Ackerman, supra note 11, at
660 (arguing that the President's election means that "[n]o cabinet secretary ever imagines
himself operating on the same plane of legitimacy as his boss").
124. See Stack, supra note 122, at 294 (pointing out that "agency heads generally have a
sense of loyalty to the President or commitment to the President's policies").
125. Cf Strauss, Overseer, supra note 15, at 714 (pointing out that powerful executive
branch officials, even when formally removable by the President, cannot be removed without
substantial political cost).
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sense of duty and mission, exactly as the Founders did when they inserted
the Oath Clauses.
A sense of duty to the President probably explains why U.S. Attorneys,
whom the Bush Administration ultimately fired, agreed to the
Administration's request that they review voting rights cases. 126 If the
President made this request, he exercised "executive power" and their
agreement to invest substantial time in examining these cases suggests that
even somewhat independent officers respect that power. The U.S.
Attorneys also acted properly, however, when they refused to prosecute
cases, having found insufficient evidence to warrant prosecution. 127 By
doing so, they did not deny the President executive power. For his
executive power consists of a power to lead and cajole, not to exercise
complete control. '2 8
The Constitution does not deny the President political influence. Vesting
him with executive power and providing for his election does make him a
powerful political actor. But to read the Vesting Clause so broadly as to
deny the role of duty-bound officials or Congress in shaping executive
branch political decisions about how to execute law simply ignores most of
the provisions that speak directly about the relationship between the
President and others. 129 Thus, the Constitution's text as a whole establishes
a duty-based theory, even if the Vesting Clause in isolation might plausibly
be read to establish the President's complete control over the executive
branch.
C. The Political Dimension: Structure and Intertextual Analysis
The Constitution does not give any branch of government, let alone a
single individual, sole control over political decisions. Instead, it sets up
competing institutions precisely in order to instigate a process of
competition to control policy, in hopes that the resulting compromises will
reflect the People's will.
No branch of government has complete control over its political
decisions. The primary body for political decision making, the Congress,
126. DAVID IGLESIAS & DAVIN SEAY, IN JUSTICE 86 (2008) (explaining that David Iglesias
formed a task force to review evidence of voter fraud).
127. See id. at 87 (stating that Iglesias found no prosecutable cases after his extensive
review of files); Kondracke Assumed Voter Fraud as Fact in Claiming Prosecutor Firings
Were About "The Failure To Prosecute" It, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM., July 12, 2007,
http://mediamatters.org/research/200707120008 (reporting that former prosecutor, John
McKay, who was accused of failure to pursue voter fraud, did not convene a grand jury on
the issue because he thought "'there was no evidence of voter fraud"').
128. See Pierce, supra note 60 (manuscript at 10-11) (claiming that "jawboning" has
always been the most important source of presidential influence over the bureaucracy);
Stack, supra note 122, at 295-96 (distinguishing between the presidential power to influence
an agency from a power to direct a particular outcome).
129. Cf Froomkin, supra note 16, at 812-13 (arguing that the "Take Care Clause"
authorizes the President to enforce congressional performance standards, not to "create the
standards" himself).
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does not have complete control over legislation, for the Constitution
empowers the President to veto legislation. 130 Only in the rare case when
public support for a particular piece of legislation produces a two-thirds
congressional majority for a vetoed bill may Congress legislate without the
President's assent. 131 Similarly, the judiciary, while obviously enjoying a
great deal of independence, must implement laws passed by others.
Congress may and sometimes does override even the Supreme Court's
decisions interpreting statutes, by passing fresh legislation to overturn a
judicial decision. 132 While considerably more difficult, the states may
amend the Constitution to override a judicial construction of the
Constitution, as they did with respect to an early judicial construction of the
Eleventh Amendment. 133 And the Congress has substantial control over the
judiciary's jurisdiction, for it can deny the Supreme Court authority to hear
appeals in a category of cases, and the lower courts only exist because
Congress decided to bring them into being. 134 In light of the significant
interbranch controls over Congress and the judiciary, it would be surprising
indeed to learn that the Constitution gave the President unilateral control
over executive branch political decisions.
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (per
curiam) (noting that the veto provision makes the President "a participant in the lawmaking
process"); 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 105, at 463 (statement of James Madison)
(characterizing the President's veto power as a qualification of the grant of legislative power
to Congress).
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
132. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Congress Passes Civil Rights Bill, Adding Protections for
Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at A21 (explaining that a new disability rights bill
overturns "several recent Supreme Court decisions").
133. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 719-21 (1999) (discussing how the Eleventh
Amendment overruled Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (1 Dall.) 419 (1793)).
134. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145-48
(1871) (prohibiting Congress from dictating the outcomes of cases through jurisdiction
stripping); Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-14 (1868) (suggesting that
congressional power to strip the Court of jurisdiction has few limits). The extent of
congressional jurisdiction stripping power has been the subject of extended debate. See, e.g.,
RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SUPREME COURT 1-2, 285-90 (1969); Akhil R. Amar, A
Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65
B.U. L. REv. 205 (1985); Akhil R. Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of
1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499 (1990); Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REv. 1030 (1982); Robert N. Clinton, A
Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original
Understanding ofArticle 111, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1984); Gerald Gunther, Congressional
Power To Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing
Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit
the Jurisdiction of the Federal Court: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362
(1953); Lawrence G. Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitution
Limitations on Congress' Authority To Regulate the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 95
HARv. L. REv. 17 (1981); Michael Wells, Congress's Paramount Role in Setting the Scope
of Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 465 (1991); cf Calabresi & Lawson, supra note
44, at 1008 (arguing that the Constitution does not authorize stripping the Court's
jurisdiction, but rather just the moving of jurisdiction between the appellate and original
jurisdiction categories).
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The analysis of the Constitution's rejection of the patronage state
presented above shows that the Constitution establishes a system of checks
and balances to control executive branch political decision making as well,
not a system of unilateral presidential control.135 The congressional role in
appointments, removal, and creating departments (not to mention budget)
give it substantial leverage over political decision making within the
executive branch. The requirement that executive branch officials swear an
oath to defend the Constitution reinforces the congressional role in
appointments in seeking to negate efforts by Presidents to turn executive
branch officials into instruments of presidential pleasure. Instead, the
Constitution envisions a dialogue between a powerful President and
somewhat independent officials about appropriate discretionary decision
making within a rule-of-law framework. 136
D. Pre-Enactment History
Professors Calabresi and Prakash, both leading unitarians, emphasize that
originalists find history preceding enactment of the Constitution more
probative than post-enactment history. 137  The pertinent pre-enactment
history supports a duty-based theory and shows that the Framers did not
envision a patronage state.
While issues of how to structure the executive branch generated heated
debate and elaborate compromises, all agreed on the object of securing
obedience to the Constitution. 138 In the words of James Madison, the
Constitution sought to make the "private interest of every individual.., a
sentinel over the public rights." 139
The pre-enactment history shows the breadth of support for a
Constitution based on duty. 140 The Convention unanimously approved of
the idea that Oath Clauses should apply to federal officers. 141  These
clauses followed the practice of the Rump Parliament, which after
135. Accord 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 105, at 487 (statement of James Jackson)
(denying that the Constitution vests executive power in the President alone, because of the
Senate's role in appointments and treaty making); THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison),
supra note 31, at 322 (describing the Constitution as arranging "the several offices in such a
manner as that each may be a check on the other"); Strauss, Agencies, supra note 15, at 640
(noting that "[a] focus on checks and balances" legitimizes civil servants as a "fourth force
in government").
136. See generally Stack, supra note 122, at 316 (discussing the value of a dialogue
between the President and agencies for the rule of law and sound policy).
137. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 550-51.
138. Cf 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 88 (reporting
Elbridge Gerry's remark that the Oath Clauses would assure that the Officers see themselves
as part of the national government, thereby discouraging "a preference to the State
Gov[emments]").
139. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 31, at 322.
140. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 7 (2d ed. 2000) (explaining that Morris cited
the General Oath Clause's applicability to Senators as a reason to trust the Senate with the
impeachment power).
141. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 84.
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abolishing the office of King, required public officials to swear allegiance
to a republican constitution and to promise faithful performance of the
duties pertaining to their particular office. 142 Debate in the Constitutional
Convention focused on the question of whether state officials must swear
an oath of allegiance to the federal government, with the nationalists
prevailing in their view that state officials must swear such an oath. 143
The pedigree of the Take Care Clause shows that a clause vesting power
in a single executive in conjunction with a responsibility to oversee faithful
execution of the law does not imply executive control over executive
branch officials. The Take Care Clause closely tracks the language found
in the New York Constitution of 1777, which did have a single, rather than
a plural, executive. 144 New York's Constitution, like many other state
constitutions, also provided a model for the Vesting Clause, as it stipulated
that the State's "executive power ... shall be vested in a governor." 145 Yet,
the combination of a Vesting Clause, a Take Care Clause, and a single
executive in New York did not create a patronage state featuring executive
control over executive branch appointees. Instead, New York's
Constitution generally gave the appointments power to a "council for the
appointment" in which the Governor had but one vote, while authorizing
the Assembly to select the State Treasurer.' 46  And the New York
Constitution contained a general rule that offices are "held during the
pleasure of the council of appointment," not the chief executive. 147 As
Professor Edward Corwin explained long ago, the New York Constitution
gave the Governor "very little voice in either appointments or removals."14 8
Thus, the most relevant state antecedent suggests that the Constitution's
Ratifiers would not have understood the choice of a single executive model
142. See Campbell, supra note 56, at 8.
143. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 203-04.
144. See BRUFF, supra note 32, at 16 (pointing out that the New York Constitution
required the Governor "to take care that the laws are executed to the best of his ability");
CALABRESI & Yoo, supra note 18, at 32 (describing the New York Constitution as "more
unitary" than other state constitutions and noting the Framers' approval of its "articles on
executive power"); Casper, supra note 105, at 241 (describing the New York Constitution as
the state constitution most "generous ... toward the executive branch").
145. N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XVII, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 2623, 2632 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909).
146. Id. art. XXIII. The Council consisted of one senator from each district and the
Governor. See id.
147. Id. art. XXVIII.
148. 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 354 (Richard Loss ed., 1981) (emphasis added).
Nor were these the only similarities between Article II and New York's constitutional
framework for executive power. See CORWIN, supra note 40, at 7 (explaining that the New
York governor was elected, bore the title of Commander-in-Chief, and possessed a power to
pardon); THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 31, at 416 (stating that
"there is a close analogy between [the President] and a governor of New York").
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through the Vesting and Take Care Clauses as establishing complete
executive control over officers. 149
Indeed, the Framers of the Federal Constitution considered and rejected a
model of complete presidential control over executive branch officials.
Early on, the Framers supported a proposal that allowed the President alone
to appoint executive officers "not otherwise provided for."150 On June 18,
1787, Hamilton suggested that the President alone should appoint the heads
of the departments of Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs. 151 The Framers,
however, ultimately created a senatorial role in selection of high
officeholders to appease a number of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention who believed that "granting the appointment power to the
executive would lead to monarchy." 152 The Senate power would serve as a
safeguard against "incautious or corrupt" presidential nominations.1 53 At
the same time, the Framers rejected proposals to allow the legislature sole
control over appointments, a model found in many state constitutions. 154
The requirement that only candidates securing the approval of both the
President and the Senate assume high office increases the likelihood that
only those likely to take their duties to properly implement the law
seriously would assume office.
In addition, members of the Convention proposed that major cabinet
officers "be appointed by the President during pleasure," which would
mean that the President could remove them at will. 155 And a report of the
Committee on Details reflects a proposal to empower the President to
"suspend Officers, civil and military."' 156 The Constitution eventually
proposed and ratified, however, reflected the rejection of these proposals to
empower the President to remove or suspend officers.
The records of the Federal Convention suggest that the proponents of
executive power gave away complete presidential control over appointees
in exchange for abandonment of a true plural executive model, with a
committee playing a key mandatory role in determining executive actions.
The rejected provisions making heads of departments removable at will
149. See 1 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 471-72
(1905) (describing John Jay, Robert Livingston, and Gouvemeur Morris as exercising a
"controlling influence in preparing" the New York State Constitution through their
membership on the drafting committee).
150. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 47 (Bicentennial ed., W.W. Norton 1987) (1893); 1 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 67; see also GERHARDT, supra note 100, at
19 (explaining that this proposal was generally intended to give the executive sole control
over appointments).
151. GERHARDT, supra note 100, at 19. Even this proposal, however, contemplated a
Senate role in other appointments. See id.
152. Id. at 17.
153. Id. at 23.
154. See Strauss, Agencies, supra note 15, at 599 & n.99.
155. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 335-36, 342-43
(proposing presidential appointment at pleasure for secretaries of domestic affairs,
commerce, foreign affairs, war, marine, and state).
156. See id. at 158.
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formed part of a proposal to have an executive council advising the
President. 15 7  Proponents of a plural executive probably offered this
presidential control over appointment and removal in a bid to secure
adoption of this modest form of a plural executive, having failed to
convince the majority to allow for a committee at the head of the executive
branch. 158 The debates reveal that the Framers viewed a congressional
check on appointments or an executive council as two ways of addressing
the fears of monarchy that a number of Framers expressed and that could
lead the people to reject the Constitution. 159 The Constitution adopted at
the Convention (and ultimately ratified by the people) reflects a
compromise in which the advocates of presidential power defeated the
plural executive proposals, but gave up control over executive branch
appointments and removal as part of the bargain. 160
The decision in favor of a single executive did not establish complete
presidential power over other executive branch officials. The Framers
considered the question of whether they should propose a single executive
model to the People as separate from the question of what power the
executive would yield and how it would be checked. 161 Indeed, Madison,
in an effort to bring some order to an unruly debate over his unitary
executive proposal, suggested that the Convention "fix the extent of the
Executive authority" before deciding between "a unity and a plurality in the
Executive," 162 an indication that he viewed the questions of plurality versus
singularity and the general nature of executive authority as separate
matters. 163
Furthermore, the arguments that ultimately persuaded the Framers to
choose a single President have little to do with the question of whether an
official other than the President might yield authority unchecked by him.
They expressed concern about the prospect of a committee running an
executive branch failing to agree upon a question, especially in the context
157. Id. at 335-42.
158. See id. at 538-39, 542 (reflecting James Wilson's preference for a council over a
Senate role in appointments).
159. See, e.g., 1 id. at 66 (referring to the unitary executive as the "foetus of monarchy").
160. See id. at 66, 71-74, 88, 91-92; 2 id. at 335-37, 533, 537, 542; see also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129-31 (1976) (per curiam) (describing the provisions providing for
shared presidential and senatorial appointment as a compromise arrived at after considering
provisions giving the President sole control over some appointments and the Senate sole
control over others).
161. See I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 96
(distinguishing questions of the degree of executive power from the question of whether to
have "co-ordinate heads" of the executive department); see also id. at 63 (showing
assignment of executive power and appointment power to an "executive" after postponement
of a proposal to specify that the executive is unitary).
162. See id. at 66.
163. Cf Strauss, Agencies, supra note 15, at 600 (acknowledging a decision to create a
politically accountable unitary executive, but finding the Constitution "ambivalent" about
the nature of the President's relationships with those actually administering the laws).
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of war. 164  The advocates of a vigorous executive convinced their
opponents that this paralysis possibility should lead them to accept a single
President that would not be required to consult an executive council.
Rejection of a committee, however, does not signal a clear decision
rejecting giving authority to single independent officers of the
government. 165
Duty's centrality becomes even more apparent when one considers the
important role the Framers envisioned for state execution of federal law.
During the debate over the Constitution's ratification many expressed
anxiety over federal officials enforcing laws within the states, especially in
the context of collecting tax revenue. 166 If the Framers envisioned a unitary
state, one would have expected them to have responded with assurances that
the President would control and reign in abusive federal tax collectors.
That, however, was not the response. Instead, the Constitution's
proponents assured the fearful that state officials would collect federal taxes
and enforce other federal laws. 167
164. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 96-97
(showing that a resolution favoring a unitary executive passed just after Wilson and Gerry
had raised the nonagreement problem, with Gerry opining that this problem would be
"extremely inconvenient in many instances, particularly in military matters"); id. at 105
(citing the prospect of "anarchy and confusion" from nonagreement of a plural executive just
before a motion affirming the unitary choice carried); see also Strauss, Agencies, supra note
15, at 600 (characterizing the choice of a single executive as a rejection of a large "executive
body" (citing CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789, at 89
(1923))).
165. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 158
(proposing to "vest" the executive authority in the President but then imposing a duty to
"attend to" the execution of the laws, rather than to actually carry them out); PHELPS, supra
note 2, at 143 (discussing congressional abandonment during the Revolutionary War of
"plural executives"-government by committee-in favor of "individual secretaries for war,
marine, foreign affairs, and finance" (emphasis added)). Washington personally believed in
a strong unitary executive model, where the President would have complete control over the
executive branch of government, including appointments. Id. at 142-49. But the
Constitutional Convention rejected that model when it allowed the Senate a role in
approving appointments and provided for impeachment. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 6
(granting the Senate the "sole Power to try all Impeachments"); id. art. II, § 2, c!. 2
(providing for appointment "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate").
166. See Prakash, supra note 76, at 1996-97, 2002-03 (discussing "those who feared the
specter of a large federal bureaucracy" often in the context of discussions of tax collection).
167. See id. at 2003-04 (explaining that both Federalists and Anti-Federalists "understood
that state officers" would enforce federal law); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; MAX
M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 101-28 (2003); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 27, 36
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 31, at 176 (stating that the government would employ
each state's "ordinary magistracy" in "the execution of' federal law and would give effect to
the Constitution); THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 31 (explaining
that in instances of disobedience and disorder state militiamen would serve under federal
command); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 44, 45 (James Madison), supra note 31, at 289, 292
(respecting tax collection and state officers' "essential agency in giving effect to the ...
Constitution"); William C. Banks, Providing Supplemental Security-The Insurrection Act
and the Military Role in Responding to Domestic Crises, 3 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y
(forthcoming 2009); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law:
Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1343 (2006) (pointing out that use
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The President, of course, would have no authority to appoint or remove
these officials. 168 The Constitution does, however, contain a duty-based
means of checking abusive state officials. 169 For the Constitution requires
not just federal officials, but also state officials, to swear to support the
Constitution under the General Oath Clause. 170 And the argument made
above that this duty should make oath swearers responsive to legitimate
presidential requests seeking to reign in abuse, while obligating them to
resist illegal presidential directives, applies to state officials. The notion of
a large federal bureaucracy under presidential control is a modem invention
not within the contemplation of the Framers. 171
As the ratification debate proceeded, Hamilton recognized that the
Constitution adopted, in spite of his best efforts, did not provide for the
patronage state, but instead embraced the concept of duty and fidelity to
law. He explained in The Federalist Papers that with respect to
appointments, the Constitution subjects the President "to the control of a
branch of the legislative body," because of fears of "abuse of the executive
authority" respecting appointment. 172 Hamilton explains, again in The
Federalist Papers, that the Senate role in appointments prevents appointees
too easily controlled by the President from assuming office. He describes
the Senate advice and consent role as discouraging the President from
nominating candidates "personally allied to him, or . . . possessing the
necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious
instruments of his pleasure."' 173 This anti-quisling statement supports the
implication already drawn from the General Oath Clause, that the Founders
intended executive officers to have some degree of independence from the
President, at least sufficient to make them a force for the rule of law. Thus,
he justified the Senate's role in appointments as a measure designed to
of state enforcers was viewed during the Federalist period "as a means of restraining" the
federal government's power); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Calling Forth Clause and the
Domestic Commander in Chief, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 1091, 1098 (2008) (pointing out that
the debate over ratification focused on whether the state militia would be called out, with no
room for the use of federal troops in the case of insurrection). The Constitution explicitly
provides for presidential control over the state militias, but nowhere provides him with
authority to direct state officials executing federal law absent an insurrection or rebellion
necessitating a calling of a state militia into service. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (making
the President "Commander in Chief' of state militias when they are pressed into federal
service).
168. See Prakash, supra note 76, at 2000 (pointing out that Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison recognized that "the federal government would have no direct influence on
the selection of state officers" (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison), supra note
31, at 291)).
169. See id. at 2001 (explaining that state officials have a duty to enforce federal law).
170. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
171. See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 691 (pointing out that the Founders did not "have
the slightest idea" that the federal government's civilian workforce would grow from the
2597 officials of 1802 to the 1,872,000 in 1997); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1233-37 (1994) (discussing the federal
bureaucracy's growth over time).
172. TIE FEDERALIST No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 31, at 464.
173. Id. No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 31, at 458.
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discourage nomination of people that the President could completely
control. 174
Hamilton's comments on removal likewise acknowledge the
Constitution's rejection of the patronage state. In The Federalist Papers
Number 77 he explains that the requirement of Senate approval of
appointments contributes to "stability of the administration."' 175  This
stability arises, Hamilton explains, because the Senate's approval would be
required in order to remove an executive officer. 176 Thus, Hamilton
assumed that the President would lack the power to unilaterally remove an
executive officer; rather, he could only do so with the Senate's assent. This
may reflect a belief that impeachment constitutes the exclusive procedure
for removing executive branch officials, or it may instead assume that any
additional procedures must conform to the principle that officeholders
retain their positions "on the pleasure of those who appoint them."' 177 His
explanation of how the Senate's role in removal contributes to stability
wholly rejects the patronage state and embraces a duty-based model:
A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so
violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the government as
might be expected if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in
any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new
President would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a
person more agreeable to him by the apprehension that a discountenance
of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of
discredit upon himself. 178
This passage clearly treats the lack of presidential control of removal as a
virtue. Hamilton finds the Senate role salutary because it discourages
replacement of fit officers with people "more agreeable" to the President.
This rejection of presidential political control through appointment of
"agreeable" officers strongly suggests endorsement of a model of
government based on expertise and duty and a rejection of the unitary
executive theory's political dimension. The references to the President as
merely the "Chief Magistrate," a modest locution found throughout The
Federalist Papers, reinforces the impression that the Constitution that
Hamilton here defended seeks a stable rule of law, not the rule of
174. Id.
175. Id. No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 31, at 459.
176. Id. (stating that "The consent of [the Senate] would be necessary to displace as well
as to appoint"); cf Seth Barrett Tillman, The Puzzle of Hamilton's Federalist No. 77, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1-15), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1331664 (conceding that the courts and
commentators have read this passage as addressing removal, but arguing that in spite of the
juxtaposition of "displace and appoint" the term "displace" might refer to removal through
an appointment only).
177. THE FEDERALIST No. 66 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 31, at 404 (claiming that
all state governments follow the practice of "rendering those who hold office during pleasure
dependent on the pleasure of those who appoint them").
178. Id. No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3 1, at 459.
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presidential personality based on a particular set of personal policy
preferences. ' 79
The intertemporal stability that Hamilton champions constitutes a well-
established element of the very idea of a "rule of law" that the
Constitution's drafters passed down to us. The "rule of law" implies that
the election of a new President will not radically change the law's meaning,
absent a congressional decision to amend it. 180 The Constitution locates the
political power to alter policy, not in unilateral presidential preferences, but
in the legislative process, which the President participates in, but does not
control. 181
The Founders shared a vision of a government not dominated by politics
and faction, but rather by a public-regarding sense of duty, what historian
Gordon Wood has referred to as a "vision of disinterested leadership."' 182
The notion that the President would have a policy of his own different from
that of Congress simply played no part in the Republican ideology of the
Founders. 183  Indeed, at the founding the constitutional vision of
congressional dominance in policy was so strong that it led George
Washington to refrain from vetoing domestic measures he disagreed with
on policy grounds and from proposing specific legislation. 184 The notion
that the political preference of a sitting President, as opposed to the policy
decisions embodied in statutes that the President has not vetoed, would
179. See, e.g., id. Nos. 66, 68-77 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 3, 4 (John Jay), Nos. 39,
47, 48 (James Madison), No. 18 (James Madison with Alexander Hamilton), supra note 31;
Prakash, supra note 76, at 2034 (characterizing the magistracy as "servants of the laws of the
land," rather than as sovereign (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 16 (Alexander Hamilton), supra
note 3 1, at 117)). Prakash insists that the magistracy cannot "pick and choose" which laws
to enforce. Id. While he makes these remarks in the context of explaining why state judges
and executive officers must enforce federal law under the Constitution, see id., The
Federalist Papers clearly include the President as part of the magistracy, albeit as the Chief
Magistrate.
180. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1170 (2008) (describing "vertical predictability"-the consistency of law
over time-as an element of the rule of law).
181. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 31, at 309-12 (discussing
the legislature's superiority); THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 31, at
322 (stating that "[i]n republican government, . . . legislative authority ... predominates");
see also Katyal, supra note 10, at 2317 (noting the Framers' assumption that "massive
changes to the status quo required legislative enactments, not executive decrees").
182. WOOD, supra note 8, at 165.
183. See PHELPS, supra note 2, at 81 (stating that "[t]he idea that there could be equally
valid, but different, notions of the public interest" appeared nonsensical to Washington,
because he believed in a single "public interest to which virtuous men could unanimously
subscribe").
184. Id. at 139-42, 150-54 (describing Washington's approach to vetoes and legislative
proposals). Washington generally vetoed domestic legislation only on constitutional
grounds and let domestic measures he disagreed with pass. Id. at 150-54. But he did veto
measures implicating his foreign affairs power on policy grounds. Id. at 153-54.
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govern administration of domestic law appears wholly foreign to the
Framers. 185
Hamilton's comments not only reflect a key Framer's intent, they also
give us some of the best clues we have about what the people who adopted
the Constitution thought it meant. For these statements appeared in
newspaper articles intended to influence the debate over the Constitution's
ratification. 186 Since the Constitution owes its authority, not to its drafters,
but to the People who chose to adopt it, the Framers' public remarks aimed
at securing the Constitution's adoption merit special weight. 187
The Framers rejected Hamilton's effort to create a pure type of unitary
executive reflecting a system of complete presidential control. 188 The
Constitution reflects a compromise between those seeking an unfettered
executive following a rather pure model of separated powers and those
fearful of replicating monarchy, who sought congressional control of the
executive branch. 189 Both the proponents of executive independence and
vigor and those who sought legislative control and government by
committee, however, aimed to secure a government animated by a sense of
duty and fidelity to the law.
E. Duty in the Early Republic
The debates and actions of the early Republic provide some evidence of
the Framers' intent, since so many of them remained active in government
185. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 109
(reporting Madison's description of the executive's powers as "limited"); cf Strauss,
Agencies, supra note 15, at 642 (arguing that the need for priority setting and coordination
justifies presidential retention of "substantial lines of communication and guidance"),
186. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of The
Original Meaning of The United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REv. 801, 812-17 (2007)
(discussing the early publication history of these papers).
187. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-04 (1819) (pointing out
that the Constitution "derives its whole authority" from state ratifying conventions, since
"the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject" the "mere proposal" the Framers
made); GERHARDT, supra note 140, at 3 (stating that the "convention delegates themselves
recognized that their views on the meaning of the Constitution mattered less than the
opinions of the ratifiers"); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 551 (describing
originalism as based on "the text of the Constitution, as originally understood by the people
who ratified it" (emphasis added)); Powell, supra note 17, at 936-39 (explaining that
Madison and other federalists argued that the intentions of the ratifiers, not the drafters,
should guide constitutional interpretation); cf Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 612
(suggesting that Hamilton's remarks in The Federalist Papers have little probative value,
because they seek to placate the Anti-Federalists).
188. See, e.g., 2 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 64-69
(showing that advocates of a unitary executive sought to defeat the proposal to make the
President impeachable); id. at 538 (recounting objections to the Senate's role in
appointments as "blending" legislative and executive power).
189. See, e.g., id. at 639 (describing the power of the Senate over appointments and thus
over the executive branch as a substitute for the rejected constitutional council). See
generally Mashaw, supra note 167, at 1272 (describing Hamilton's defense of Article II in
The Federalist Papers as an effort to assure doubters that the President would have modest
power compared to the King of England).
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after the Constitution passed.190 The First Congress's actions in organizing
the execution of the laws reflect a consensus favoring the duty-based theory
and division on questions of presidential power.
The first statute the new Congress passed implemented the Oath Clause
that applies to lower level executive branch officials and others.' 9' Unlike
the Presidential Oath Clause, the General Oath Clause did not set forth the
required oath's language. The new Congress, before taking up the matter of
structuring executive departments, passed a law setting out the oath's
language. 192
Society took oaths seriously at the time. 193 The customs of the age
required a gentleman accused of violating an oath to seek satisfaction from
the accuser, sometimes in the form of a duel. 194  The early Congresses
added to this seriousness by passing statutes specifying penalties for oath
violations or failure to take oaths. 195  They also frequently required
officeholders to post bonds, which they would forfeit if they failed to
perform certain duties properly. 196 The early Republic employed oaths and
other mechanisms to seek to assure that those executing federal power
conformed to the law.
Consistent with the promises made during the ratification debates, the
early Republic relied heavily upon state officials to collect taxes and carry
out other federal executive functions. The President did not participate in
these officials' appointment to their offices and had no authority to remove
them from those offices. 197 He did indeed exercise influence over them,
exhorting them to properly enforce both the federal tax on liquors and later
the Neutrality Laws, the latter in the face of considerable local opposition in
some regions. 198 Having sworn an oath to support the Constitution, they
generally cooperated with the federal government in enforcing federal laws,
in spite of the President's inability to influence their appointment or
removal. 199 In 1791, Congress also delegated significant authority to a
190. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986) (explaining that the first
Congress's acts constitute "weighty evidence" of the Constitution's meaning, because
"many" of its members helped frame the Constitution).
191. WATSON, supra note 74, at 1334.
192. Act of June 1, 1789, ch. 1, § 1, 1 Stat. 23 (regulating the time and manner of
administering certain oaths).
193. Mashaw, supra note 167, at 1309 n. 167 (describing oaths as "serious business").
194. Id.; see also JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE
NEW REPUBLIC 159-98 (2001).
195. Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 20, 1 Stat. 627, 641-42 (regulating the collection of
duties on imports and tonnage); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 6, 1 Stat. 199, 200 (repealing
duties on distilled spirits); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34, § 12, 1 Stat. 138, 142 (making
provision for the payment of the United States' Debt).
196. See Mashaw, supra note 167, at 1317-18 (providing examples).
197. See Prakash, supra note 76, at 2000 (pointing out that the President exercised no
control over state officers' appointment).
198. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 14, at 640-41.
199. Id. & n.442 (discussing governors' willingness to enforce neutrality at Washington's
request).
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semiprivate corporation, the First National Bank, over which the President
exercised precious little authority.200
The First Congress did not consistently favor executive control over the
federal bureaucracy either. In statutes establishing the Departments of War,
the Navy, and Foreign Affairs, Congress directed these departments' heads
to follow the President's directions. 20 1 By contrast, Congress afforded the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Postmaster General a measure of
independence from the President. 20 2  Congress also lodged significant
specific authorities in both the heads of the Treasury Department and Post
Officers and other officials in these departments under the Necessary and
Proper Clause. 20 3
The First Congress confronted the issue of whether the President should
be able to remove officers from government when it established the federal
executive departments. The 1789 debate on this subject in Congress
suggests that after ratification members of the founding generation no
longer shared a common understanding of the Constitution's meaning with
respect to removal or had decided to continue to pursue their disparate
views of wise policy. 204 In the House debate, which we have a record of,
some opined that impeachment was the only permissible means of removal;
others insisted that the Senate must concur in removal decisions not
involving crimes; others thought that the President must have removal
authority; and still others believed that the Constitution permitted Congress
to craft removal provisions as it saw fit without significant restraints. 205
The lack of consensus about the Constitution's meaning in this debate
shows that the unitary Framers' intent favoring a senatorial role in removal
that existed prior to ratification, vanished immediately thereafter. 206
200. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, § 1, 1 Stat. 191 (incorporating subscribers to the Bank
of the United States); see Mashaw, supra note 167, at 1296 (describing the Bank as more
independent of presidential direction than today's Federal Reserve).
201. See Act of Apr. 30, 1798, ch. 35, § 1, 1 Stat. 553, 553 (imposing a duty on the
Secretary of the Navy to "execute such orders as he shall receive from the President"); Act
of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 49, 50 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2006))
(directing the Secretary of War to conduct the department's business according to the
President's instructions); Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 28, 28-29 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2651 (2006)) (directing the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to perform
duties "intrusted to him by the President" according to presidential instructions).
202. See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65, 65-66 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 31 U.S.C.); Act of May 8, 1794, ch. 23, § 3, 1 Stat. 354, 357; Charles Tiefer, The
Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U.
L. REv. 59, 74 (1983) (explaining how Congress made the Comptroller General independent
of presidential direction).
203. See Mashaw, supra note 167, at 1284-89 (describing these duties and the complex
mix of independence, congressional direction, and presidential control employed in the
enactments establishing these departments and their duties).
204. See Casper, supra note 105, at 237 (identifying the "multitude of views expressed"
about separation of powers as the most significant aspect of the House debate).
205. See id. at 234-35 (summarizing the various positions).
206. See 1 CORWIN, supra note 148, at 331-32 (claiming that only a small minority of the
House found that the President's power under Article II entitled him to have sole removal
authority); cf Froomkin, supra note 16, at 795 n.37 (criticizing Chief Justice William H.
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The House of Representatives eventually passed an enigmatic bill on
removal. It rejected language that would have unequivocally given the
President the authority to remove executive officers. Instead, the House
adopted bills that stated who should retain custody of papers whenever the
President removes the head of a department, by narrow margins.2 07 The
Senate at first refused to consent to including this language in the Treasury
Department Bill.20 8 Eventually though, the Decision of 1789-the decision
to include this language in the bills creating the Treasury, War, and Foreign
Affairs Departments-passed, because Vice President John Adams broke
ten-to-ten ties on the removal issue in the Senate. 209
While the closeness of these votes and the disparate positions taken in
debate do not establish a post-ratification consensus on the proper
constitutional removal theory, the House debates (there is no reliable record
of the Senate debates) strongly suggest that the political dimension of the
unitary executive theory enjoyed no support in the founding generation.
Those who read the Constitution as requiring presidential removal authority
argued that presidential removal authority encouraged presidential
responsibility and made it more likely that official abuse would be checked.
But they did not suggest that presidential policy should control executive
branch administration of the law. 2 10 Even those who found that the Vesting
Clause implied a presidential removal authority argued for it within a duty-
Taft's reasoning in Myers v. United States as exaggerating the "degree of unanimity" in the
Decision of 1789).
207. See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 7, 1 Stat. 65, 67 (establishing the Treasury
Department and giving the Assistant Treasury Secretary custody of papers if the President
removes the Treasury Secretary); Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 49, 50 (establishing
the Department of War and giving an inferior officer custody of papers whenever the
President removes the Secretary of War); Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 28, 29
(establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs and giving the Chief Clerk custody of
foreign papers if the President removes the Secretary of Foreign Affairs). Professor Prakash
claims that this language indicates a belief that the Constitution granted the President a
removal authority, so that congressional delegation of such an authority was either
unnecessary or inappropriate. See Prakash, supra note 51, at 1026. Most scholars who have
seriously considered the issue, however, disagree, arguing that the bill does not reflect
majority support for the notion of a constitutional power of removal. See 1 CORWIN, supra
note 148, at 332; DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD 1789-1801, at 41 n.240 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive
Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 662-63 (2004). In any
case, the closeness of the vote and the disparity of opinions expressed in the House show that
no consensus existed among the participants in this debate. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra, at
658 (finding no consensus, or even majority support, for the thesis that the Vesting Clause
implied that the Constitution requires the President to have a removal authority).
208. Prakash, supra note 51, at 1033 (explaining that the Senate deleted the entire section
containing the removal language in the Treasury bill).
209. See id. at 1032-33 (discussing the Senate's treatment of the bills on Foreign Affairs
and the Treasury).
210. Cf Strauss, Agencies, supra note 15, at 604 (arguing, from a much later perspective,
that execution of the law carries with it "a policy function" within statutorily defined
bounds).
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based framework uninfluenced by modem notions about broad presidential
policy discretion. 211
F. Function
A duty-based theory better serves the rule of law than the unitary
executive theory. It invites those interpreting the Constitution in the present
day to continue the Framers' project of trying to arrange power to produce a
rule of law, respecting the specific decisions already made in the
Constitution, but using the Framers' rule-of-law goal as the primary guide
to filling in the blanks. 212 The unitary executive theory, by contrast, seems
to depart from the Framers' vision of apolitical administration by viewing
executive power as almost an end in and of itself.213
The danger of the President unraveling the rule of law that the early
proponents of checks on executive authority recognized has become more
acute with the passage of time. The President, for better or worse, has
become a powerful political actor with influence far exceeding that which
the Framers envisioned. 214 This growth in presidential power flows in part
from the expansion of the federal government's functions, which
accompanied the United States' growth and rise to power.215  The
increasing complexity and greater scope of the problems confronting the
United States has led Congress to delegate substantial powers to the
executive branch of government to address these problems, thereby
contributing to the growth of the modem presidency. 216 The executive
211. See, e.g., I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 105, at 379, 387 (statement of James
Madison) (describing the President's responsibility as that of superintending executive
officers to ensure "good behaviour"); see also I Op. Att'y Gen. 624-26 (1823) (describing
the President's duty as ensuring honest execution of the law, not perfectly correct judgment);
LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1789-1801,
at 287-88 (First Free Press Paperback ed. 1965) (noting that President John Adams removed
officers for administrative neglect and delinquency).
212. Cf Ackerman, supra note 11, at 636-42 (proposing to advance critical thinking
about the merits of competing arrangements of power).
213. See SAVAGE, supra note 12, at 335-36 (discussing David Addington's statement that
"'[w]e're going to push and push"' with respect to expanding presidential power, "'until
some larger force makes us stop').
214. Cf Ackerman, supra note 11, at 641 (claiming that the United States has an
"excessively politicized style of bureaucratic government").
215. See SAVAGE, supra note 12, at 14-37 (contrasting the Framers' modest conception of
the presidency with subsequent growth in the office's power); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1816-17 (1996); Abner S. Greene, Checks and
Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 123, 125 (1994) (stating
that the expansion of presidential power implies that his power, rather than that of the
legislative branch, needs checking); William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential
Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 506 (2008) (claiming
that presidential power has been expanding since the Founding).
216. See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a
Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 1022 (1997) (chiding the Supreme Court for
forgetting "the contemporary reality" that Congress has delegated much of its lawmaking
power to the executive branch); Katyal, supra note 10, at 2320 (tracing the growth of
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branch often interprets the vast body of law it administers unilaterally. In
some areas, courts have no opportunity to review its decisions. 217 Even
when reviewable, the courts usually approach executive branch decisions
deferentially and often correct errors in ways that leave continuing latitude
for executive branch shaping of the law. 218 Because of the awkwardness of
impeachment and funding cutoffs, congressional oversight provides only a
very limited remedy for executive excess, and executive decisions to
withhold information can further weaken oversight's effectiveness. 219
Because modem Presidents are so profoundly political, a danger exists that
they will interpret the law opportunistically, to increase their own power
and advance their faction's political agenda, rather than faithfully execute
the laws Congress has publicly passed. 220 The opportunities for abuse have
recently multiplied, because of the specter of terrorism, which tends to drive
the executive toward secret policy making of his own largely unrestrained
by law. 221
A duty-based approach calls on the President and other officials to resist
the temptation to employ unilateral policy making as a substitute for a rule
of law. It empowers prosecutors, for example, to resist demands for
prosecution based on broadly determined political priorities, when fine-
grained analysis, which lower level officials are especially well suited to
provide, indicates a lack of evidence of sufficiently serious offenses to
justify prosecution. Often those with specialized knowledge of the law and
technical issues related to it can execute the law more faithfully than a
President who has his own political agenda, and a very broad one at that. 222
presidential power largely unchecked by Congress to the nondelegation doctrine's collapse
in the 1930s and the Supreme Court invalidation of the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha).
217. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 32 (explaining that the executive branch
usually decides legal issues related to war and intelligence for itself, because such issues
rarely reach a court).
218. See David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete
Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 808, 858-59 (2004) (explaining that
remands often do not specify cases' final outcomes).
219. Johnsen, supra note 10, at 1562-63 (explaining the limitations on congressional
oversight, impeachment, funding, and justiciability); Froomkin, supra note 16, at 797-98
(explaining that congressional threats to cut off funding "on any project of political
significance" lack credibility).
220. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 33 (discussing the danger of the executive branch
"interpreting the law opportunistically to serve its own ends"); Ackerman, supra note 11, at
700, 712 (explaining that Presidents tend to "politicize the bureaucracy" in order to carry out
their programs, especially when the President cannot obtain his goals through legislation).
221. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 183 (explaining that "[t]he President's control
over the military and intelligence agencies, his ability to act in secret, and his power to self-
interpret legal limits on his authority create extraordinary opportunities for abuse"); see also
Katyal, supra note 10, at 2343-45 (discussing the need to check the modem executive,
which conducts its business in secret and possesses far more power and resources than the
Framers anticipated); cf Ackerman, supra note 11, at 645-46 (noting that constitutions in
Latin America emulating the American presidential model have all led, at one time or
another, to dictatorship).
222. See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 689 (stating that "[u]nfenered political
intervention" has "predictably toxic effects on the rule of law").
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The specialists are more likely to have the time to fully investigate what the
law means and to appreciate its specific ramifications, even though
presidential leadership can play a role in shaping discretionary decisions
and in discouraging specialists' myopia. 223 But that leadership is most
likely to serve rather than subvert the rule of law when the President
recognizes a duty to remain faithful to policy decisions made by others,
such as the Congress, and when executive branch officials remain able to
fulfill their oath of office without having to abandon their posts. This duty-
based approach creates the conditions for a dialogue about how to exercise
discretionary authority properly, to make wise decisions with the
constraints of law.
III. THE DUTY-BASED THEORY'S IMPLICATIONS
This part explores the duty-based theory's implications for current law
and practice. It elucidates some general implications, discusses its
ramifications for current law governing removal and appointment of
executive branch officials, and closes with a discussion of independent
agencies. This analysis does not exhaust the duty-based theory's
consequences, but illustrates how it should influence current debates.
A. General Implications
The duty-based theory has important implications for constitutional law,
but cannot settle all issues of separation of powers by itself. It can support
deference to political branches' joint decisions about arrangements of
power or inform judicial decision making when courts intervene to review
the political branches' structural decisions.
The argument for more deference to political decision makers flows from
an appreciation of the difficulties involved in identifying institutional
arrangements that conform to the Ratifiers' and Framers' desire to foster
duty and the rule of law. These difficulties lie at the heart of the Framers'
decision to enact a political compromise between proponents of strong
presidential power as an aid in fostering "responsibility" and those who
feared it as a means of escaping, rather than aiding, the rule of law.
Presidents who respect the rule of law may use their power to check abuses
of the duty to obey the law. Presidents who prize their own independence
and wish to make policy themselves may undermine laws uncongenial to
them. It is entirely appropriate for Congress to approve legislation
embodying its own political judgments, within the bounds of express
constitutional constraints, about which institutional arrangements best
advance the rule of law with the pattern of executive branch conduct
223. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 180, at 1174-75 (discussing an agency tendency
toward "tunnel vision"); Strauss, Agencies, supra note 15, at 586 (describing civil servants as
knowing the statutes they administer in detail and often holding "strong views of the public
good in the field in which they work").
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observed. 224  And if the President strongly disagrees with a particular
congressional judgment of this kind, he can veto the legislation embodying
that judgment, which will then only be sustained if sufficient popular
support exists to override the veto. 225 From this perspective, the Court's
decision in Morrison may have been wise. Congress is in a better position
than a court to evaluate the question of whether the advantages of an
independent counsel outweigh the risks of abuse that such a position entails.
During an era when a President seems willing to fire Justice Department
officials not willing to do his bidding, such an institution may prove
salutary. But if evidence of prosecutorial abuse surfaces, as arguably has
occurred, Congress can adjust by reverting to more orthodox procedures, as
it did when it allowed the authorization for an independent counsel to
lapse.226 Congress and the President, on this model, continue the Framers'
work of trying to craft arrangements that foster a duty to obey the law,
within express constitutional constraints.
The duty-based approach can also aid courts in deciding separation of
powers questions, even when they do not defer to legislative judgment.
Such an approach, while not necessarily dictating any particular result in
Morrison, could have improved the Court's reasoning. Justice Scalia
rightly pointed out that the Ethics in Government Act made the independent
counsel free of presidential control, for this was the statute's primary
purpose. 227  The Court could have justified its decision better by
recognizing that the Framers sought to foster a duty to properly execute the
law, and that doing this is especially difficult when high-ranking
government officials become potential objects of law enforcement. 228 in
this context, interference with presidential control over executive branch
officials may be appropriate, as presidential control may not serve rule-of-
law values. 229 The Court should have inquired into whether the removal
224. See Strauss, Agencies, supra note 15, at 604 (arguing that the Constitution envisions
shifts in the relative strength of the President and Congress over time).
225. Cf WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE
POWER OF THE PURSE 160 (1994) (pointing out that vetoes are so difficult to override that a
threatened veto usually suffices to force a "change [in] the shape of a bill").
226. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (2006).
227. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. See BRUFF, supra note 32, at 437 (arguing that a true dilemma underlies the
independent counsel provisions, since "[p]owerful personal and political loyalties" can lead
to underprosecution of executive branch officials).
229. See S. REP. No. 95-170, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4217
(stating that the purpose of the Ethics in Government Act is "to preserve and promote the
accountability and integrity of public officials"). The majority did not rely on deference to
congressional views to justify the Court's opinion. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-74
(discussing the Appointments Clause issue with no reference to the values underlying the
clause). Justice Scalia praised the majority for not deferring to Congress, stating that such
deference is not appropriate when the two branches are in disagreement. See id. at 704-05
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Morrison, however, did not present a dispute between the executive
branch and Congress, but rather a dispute among executive branch officials, namely the
special prosecutor and the executive branch officials she was investigating. See id. at 665-68
(showing that this case arose out of an effort by three government attorneys under
investigation by independent counsel Morrison to quash a subpoena). The President was not
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provisions provided adequate checks to prevent abuses, for presidential
power is but a means, and not the only means, the Constitution employs to
secure a rule of law. 230 The duty-based theory would have provided a
means of grappling with the core constitutional issues the case posed.
Of course, the Morrison Court did not write on a blank slate. The
Court's opinion proved unsatisfactory, because it had to take into account
prior dicta that reflects acceptance of some elements of the unitary
executive theory, at least with respect to removal. We now must consider
the duty-based theory's implications for patronage state, including the law
on both appointment and removal.
B. Whither the Patronage State?
1. Removal
The duty-based theory implies that the Constitution does not require
Congress to authorize presidential removal of purely executive officials "at
will." An authority to fire employees "for cause" adequately secures
faithful law execution, for such a provision authorizes removals for
malfeasance in office.
The notion that the President must have an authority to fire at will comes
from the political dimension of the unitary executive theory-that the
President has a constitutional right to control the government for his own
political ends. We have seen that this political dimension is utterly foreign
to the Framers' conception of executive power.
The Supreme Court has regularly approved provisions prohibiting
removal of officials except for cause. 231 While lawyers often cite the
Supreme Court's case in Myers v. United States232 for the proposition that
the Constitution requires at-will removal, 233 that case has a much narrower
a party to this suit. Moreover, the President had signed this legislation. Remarks on Signing
S. 555 into Law, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1854, 1855 (Oct. 26, 1978) (characterizing
the Special Prosecutor as a "necessary ... response" to past embarrassments); Devins, supra
note 15, at 283-84 (noting President Ronald Reagan's approval of a legislation ceding
executive authority to the independent counsel). Scalia's remarks provide an inadequate
rationale for not seriously considering whether the Court should defer, at least to some
extent, to the political branches' agreement that this reform would serve the rule of law.
230. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at .727-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the theoretical
potential for vigorous prosecution of fairly minor offenses without any examination of the
actual experience under the statute); cf BRUFF, supra note 32, at 437 (noting lawyers'
tendency to be overzealous).
231. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-86 (upholding provision authorizing only for-cause
removal of an independent counsel); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958)
(holding that the President may not fire a member of the War Claims Commission, even
though no statute limited removal); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-29
(1935) (holding that Congress may limit the grounds for removing a member of a quasi-
legislative or quasi-judicial agency).
232. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
233. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 688-89 (discussing appellee's contention that the
President must be able to remove purely executive officers at will under Myers).
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holding. The Myers Court invalidated a provision that only authorized the
President to remove a postmaster if the Senate consented.234 It held that the
President has the authority to remove officers without the Senate's consent,
but did not have before it a provision presenting the question of whether the
removal must be at will.235
A clear rule allowing for-cause removal of all officers resolves
contradictions in the Court's removal jurisprudence and supports a less ad
hoc approach. In Morrison, the Court indicated that restrictions upon
removal must not "impede the President's ability to perform his
constitutional duty."236 In response, Justice Scalia complained, not without
reason, that this test provides no clear rule for decision, as it depends upon
the Court's subjective assessment of how much removal restriction is
tolerable. 237 A proper understanding of the Constitution's emphasis on
duty and a rejection of the political dimension of the unitary executive
theory solves this problem. Restrictions on removal should always be
constitutional if they do not impede the President's duty as defined in the
Constitution, which as we have seen, requires that he seek faithful
execution of the law. He may wish to exercise policy control over all
discretionary government decisions, but he does not have to do so in order
to seek faithful execution of the law. 238
This also solves another problem arising from the Court's jurisprudence.
The Court has often suggested that the question of whether the Constitution
requires at-will removal hinges on an assessment of whether the officer in
question is performing executive, judicial, or quasi-legislative functions. 239
This functional approach makes the constitutionality of removal restrictions
hinge upon unpredictable efforts by the Court to characterize particular
official functions as executive, judicial, or quasi-legislative, 240 A bright-
line rule accepting for-cause removal solves this problem. This functional
234. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 107, 162 (showing that the Court invalidated a provision
requiring Senate approval of presidential removal decisions, because the President alone has
removal power).
235. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687 n.24 (describing "the only issue actually decided in
Myers" as whether the President could remove a postmaster without the Senate's consent);
Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 626 (same).
236. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 (emphasis added).
237. Id. at 711-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord BRUFF, supra note 32, at 442
(describing the test as generally "quite difficult to apply"); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 354 (3d ed. 2006) (describing this test as
neither "clear" nor "easy to apply").
238. Cf Myers, 272 U.S. at 134 (justifying at-will removal by reference to the President's
"discretion" to determine the "national public interest").
239. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687 (stating that Congress may limit the removal of
officers, "at least" if they are performing quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative functions);
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353 (1958) (defining the issue before the Court in
terms of the officer's function); Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 627 (distinguishing Myers as
an opinion pertaining to an officer "restricted to ... executive functions").
240. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689 n.28 (recognizing "[t]he difficulty of defining such
categories"); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879) (same); Strauss, Agencies, supra
note 15, at 579 (stating that the separation-of-powers theory "breaks down" when applied to
"agencies within one of the three branches").
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approach emerges from an attempt to reconcile some of former President
(and then-Chief Justice) William Howard Taft's statements in Myers
suggesting that a postmaster must be removable at will with the Court's
holdings that for-cause removal suffices.2 4 1 Morrison's upholding of for-
cause removal of a purely executive officer supersedes Myers's dictum on
this point, and the Court should clarify the law by repudiating former
President and Justice Taft's extraneous statements more clearly than it has
in prior cases. 242
The duty-based theory informs debate about more theoretical removal
questions, even if it does not clearly resolve every question. The theory's
originalism can clash with some views of duty-based functional
considerations embedded in constitutional custom and precedent.
From a functional standpoint, the President's duty to faithfully execute
the law may seem to require Congress to give him for-cause removal
authority. But the Framers' omission of presidential removal authority
suggests that the President can "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed" without unilateral removal authority, even though he cannot
personally assure their faithful execution without such an authority. Still,
for-cause removal authority can serve rule-of-law values at the heart of
theory.
If the duty-based theory allows unilateral presidential removal authority
it may permit (even though it does not require) delegation of at-will
removal authority. The Constitution does not, on this reading, prohibit
presidential politics or congressional acquiescence in the growth of
presidential power. If Congress finds that the President respects the rule of
law and exercises his discretion wisely, Congress may properly decide that
the President should have a broad removal power. But if it finds that the
President uses the ability to fire employees at will to prevent employees of
the executive branch from following the law, it should deny at-will removal
authority. For.then the authority nullifies the Constitution's constraint on
presidential abuse embodied in the General Oath clause, since it can render
a duty-bound official's refusal to perform an illegal act nugatory.243
A strict adherence to original intention, however, supports forbidding
presidential removal without Senate consent, at least in the case of "Officers
241. Compare Myers, 272 U.S. at 134 (claiming that the President must have the
authority to fire those he loses confidence in), with Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691-92 (upholding
provisions forbidding at-will removal of the independent counsel), and Humphrey's Ex'r,
295 U.S. at 629 (upholding provisions forbidding at-will removal of a member of the Federal
Trade Commission).
242. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687 (disapproving of Myers's dicta to some extent, but
stating that for-cause removal is constitutional "[a]t least in regard to 'quasi-legislative' and
'quasi-judicial' agencies"); Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 626 (disapproving of unidentified
statements supporting the government's argument for at-will removal "[i]n so far as they are
out of harmony with the views here set forth"); cf id. at 627 (acknowledging that dicta need
not be followed unless persuasive).
243. See generally Froomkin, supra note 16, at 789 (noting that "autonomy requires
insulation from politically motivated removal").
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of the United States." Originalist precepts insist that text and
contemporaneous history carry more weight than post-enactment history.
The text and pre-enactment history support a mandatory Senate role in
removal. In light of the lack of post-enactment consensus about
presidential removal authority, especially in the Senate, it is poor
originalism to invoke that Decision of 1789 to support a constitutional rule
that Congress must allow the President to remove officers of the United
States without Senate approval. 244
Of course, Myers held that Congress may not insist on Senate consent to
removal, and constitutional custom supports allowing Congress to delegate
some removal authority to the President. So the duty-based theory's
clarification of original intention raises issues of how much weight to give
original intent in light of precedent and custom departing from that intent.
The duty-based theory reveals an original intent disfavoring unilateral
presidential removal, even though for-cause removal authority can aid
faithful law execution. Even if it is too late in the day to conform our
practice to that intent, we should recognize that the Constitution does not
affirmatively require Congress to give the President the power to remove
officials.
2. Appointment
The duty-based theory supports an appointments process aimed at
securing apolitical government, such as the civil service laws. 245  The
theory's unremarked influence helps explain why these laws came into
being. The political dimension of the unitary executive theory threatens
this ideal of apolitical administration. The civil service laws require
nonpartisan hiring. If we accept, however, the notion that the President has
the right to have officials under him loyal to his priorities, rather than to the
law's priorities, then the civil service laws appear constitutionally
suspect.246
Justice Department attorneys, apparently viewing their job as the one
suggested by the unitary executive theory, recently sought to hire
244. Cf Myers, 272 U.S. at 108-39 (providing a brief discussion of constitutional text
and pre-enactment history and a lengthy discussion of the post-enactment Decision of 1789).
245. See Gerald E. Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service
Employees, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 942, 947-61 (1976) (discussing the history of civil service
reform); Strauss, Agencies, supra note 15, at 582 (characterizing a "civil service, largely
insulated from politics" as the "fourth effective branch" of government).
246. Compare Strauss, Agencies, supra note 15, at 608 (explaining that the civil service
laws sharply limit presidential control of civil servants), with CALABRESI & Yoo, supra note
18, at 230 (recognizing that "expansion of the civil service is often perceived as inconsistent
with the unitariness of the executive branch," but opining that this perception is not correct).
See generally Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutors: Looking Back and
Looking Forward, 58 DuKE L.J. 2087, 2091 (2009) (claiming that "decisions about
enforcement-power allocation" are "inextricably intertwined with preferences about
priorities").
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employees "attuned to the interests and the policies of the Presiden[t],"2 47
in violation of the civil service laws forbidding partisan appointments. 248
Indeed, one of these employees when called to account for this partisan
hiring in a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee said that she took
her "oath to the President very seriously." 249 In a contemporary illustration
of the Oath Clause's continued relevance, Senator Patrick Leahy reminded
her that she swore an oath to the Constitution, not the President, obviously
in an effort to remind her of her duties to obey the law. 250 While even the
Bush Administration did not explicitly claim that the civil service laws were
unconstitutional, the political dimension of the unitary executive theory
does raise this issue.251
The Myers Court confronted the conflict of the theory of the patronage
state with the civil service laws and opted to preserve the civil service laws,
declining to extend its dicta demanding at-will removal authority to the
inferior officers covered by civil service restrictions on personnel
actions. 252  Indeed, the Myers Court, consistent with the duty-based
theory's rejection of the political dimension of the unitary theory, insisted
that Congress could apply the merit system to a wider array of government
officials by vesting the appointment power over officials then subject to
presidential nomination and Senate approval requirements in heads of
departments in order to "remove[] [them] from politics." 253
The Morrison Court's approach to the Appointments Clause, however,
calls the flexibility Myers envisioned for congressional classification of
officers into question. For the Justices, both the majority and the dissent,
sought to limit Congress's ability to choose whether Senate confirmation is
required through an unsuccessful attempt to create judicial guidance about
247. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 712 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248. See OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODL1NG
AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 135-39 (2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/goodling072408.pdf (concluding that Monica Goodling and others
committed numerous violations of the civil service law requiring nonpartisan hiring
practices); OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE HONORS PROGRAM AND SUMMER LAW INTERN PROGRAM 99 (2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/oig-opr-investigation-hire-slip.pdf (finding political hiring
practices that violated civil service law and Justice Department policy).
249. Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing
the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 411 (2007) (testimony of Sara M. Taylor, Former Deputy Assistant to President
Bush and Director of Political Affairs at the White House).
250. See id. at 416-17.
251. Cf SAVAGE, supra note 12, at 239-40 (noting that President Bush used a signing
statement to argue that the President need not obey laws establishing minimum professional
qualifications for Federal Emergency Management Agency employees).
252. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 173-74 (1926) (affirming that Congress may
attack the spoils system through civil service reform).
253. Id.; accord Strauss, Agencies, supra note 15, at 614 (describing Myers as
recognizing that Congress may place the Postmaster General beyond presidential control by
making him part of the civil service).
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the meaning of the terms "Officers of the United States" and "inferior
Officers." 254 The Constitution requires that the President nominate and the
Senate confirm Officers of the United States, but allows Congress to vest
the power to appoint Inferior Officers in the judiciary or other parts of the
government. 255 Hence, a holding that an independent counsel is an Officer
of the United States would require invalidation of the statutory provision
authorizing the judiciary to appoint her.256 The opaque language of these
undefined terms left the Court rudderless. 257 The independent counsel's
independence suggests that she is not an Inferior Officer, as Justice Scalia
pointed out in dissent. 25 8  On the other hand, her limited jurisdiction
suggests that she is nothing like the department heads that traditionally have
been considered "Officers of the United States. ' 259  Hence, the
Constitution's undefined language could not satisfactorily resolve the
question, and neither the majority nor the dissent could make a persuasive
argument for their positions on how to classify the office of independent
counsel. 260
A duty-based approach would have helped the Court address the issue at
hand more effectively by encouraging it to grapple more forthrightly with
the question of whether an independent counsel furthered the rule of law.261
While formal rules might resolve some cases, in cases such as this where
they cannot help much, value choices, whether articulated or not, control
the results. When such a case arises under Article II, the principal relevant
value choice animating this part of the Constitution, namely the Founders'
and Ratifiers' decision to seek an executive branch dedicated to faithfully
executing the law, should inform judicial decision making.
C. Independent Agencies
Congress has sought to make some agencies independent by limiting the
President's power to appoint or remove their leaders. 262  These limits
include requirements that commissioners have relevant expertise, serve for
relatively long and staggered terms in office, and remain immune from at-
will removal. 263
254. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
255. Id.
256. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988).
257. See id. (acknowledging that the "line" between inferior and principal officers is
unclear).
258. See id. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259. See id. at 670, 672.
260. See BRUFF, supra note 32, at 403 (characterizing the arguments on this point as
"approximately in equipoise").
261. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REv. 105,
126 (1988).
262. See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459,459 (2008).
263. See id. at 462 (characterizing "partisan requirements ... and for-cause limits" on
removal as intended to limit presidential control).
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These arrangements seem, at first glance, to epitomize the ideal of
relying on independent officials' sense of duty as a key element of
administration. But this Article has defined the duty-based theory as one
that contemplates presidential leadership aimed at securing faithful
execution of the law. Unitarians might object that independent agencies
involve not just a rejection of presidential control, but a rejection of the sort
of presidential influence the duty-based theory embraces.
Happily for independent agencies' supporters, "empirical studies show
that presidents have significant influence over policy," even in
"independent agencies. ' 264 The duty-based theory only requires significant
presidential influence over law execution aimed at avoiding faithless
execution of law, not necessarily significant control over policy making.
Independent agencies, however, may properly exercise quasi-legislative
authority without substantial presidential involvement. As the Supreme
Court explained in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,265 the Constitution
does not authorize the President to make law. 266 While Youngstown does
not preclude Congress from delegating quasi-legislative authority to the
President, it does show that the power to make law, unlike the power to
execute law, does not inherently belong to the President. It comes into the
President's office only because of congressional delegation. 267  And
Congress may, if it likes, place the delegated power elsewhere, such as in
independent agencies.
The unitary executive theory, even if it were correct, could not justify
requiring that the President control execution of quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial authority, for that power is not what the Framers had in mind when
they created a unitary executive. 268 This much flows from the textual limits
of the Vesting Clause itself, which only vests "executive" power.269 The
264. Stack, supra note 122, at 298; see also Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and
Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 207-18 (1982) (finding a correlation
between presidency changes and independent agency policy shifts); Terry M. Moe, The
Politicized Presidency, in NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 235, 269-71 (John E.
Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) (finding greater presidential than congressional
control over the federal bureaucracy); Strauss, Agencies, supra note 15, at 590-96
(discussing sources of presidential influence over independent agencies); B. Dan Wood &
Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL.
SCI. REv. 801, 812-23 (1991).
265. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
266. Id. at 587-88 (claiming that the President's faithful execution power "refutes the
idea that he is to be a lawmaker").
267. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American Political
Departments, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 17 (1974) (describing how power has flowed to
the President through delegations and acquiescence).
268. See 1 CORWIN, supra note 148, at 318-20 (explaining why it is desirable to create
independence for officials carrying out quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative functions).
269. Accord Bruce Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power of the President To Execute the Laws,
46 TENN. L. REv. 757, 773 (1979) (pointing out that quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
power are "not now considered ... part of the executive power" and are therefore beyond the
"President's reach"). Contra Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 1183 n.153 (arguing that
powers exercised by bureaucrats must be executive, because Congress may only delegate
executive power).
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relevant Supreme Court precedent supports this. In Humphrey's Executor
v. United States270 and Wiener v. United States,271 the Supreme Court
distinguished and to some extent repudiated Myers's unitary dicta, in order
to uphold the practice of insulating independent agencies exercising quasi-
judicial and quasi-legislative powers. 272 Accordingly, even Justice Scalia's
articulation of the unitary theory in Morrison confined itself to the exercise
of purely executive powers. 273
The Framers did not contemplate making the President the sole author of
quasi-legislative rules or judicial decisions.274 And this is not only because
they did not contemplate broad delegation at all. It is also because they did
not contemplate the modem political role of the President. The Framers'
rejection of the political dimensions of the unitary executive theory implies
that Congress may delegate quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial authority to
executive branch entities not completely under the presidential thumb.
While the duty-based theory accepts agency independence, the
underlying analysis raises some questions about requiring collective
executive branch decision making. After all, the theory accepts the idea
that the Framers chose a single executive to avoid decision by committee,
especially in the context of defense and foreign affairs. Collective decision
making, unlike independent decision making by a single individual,
threatens that model. 275
270. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
271. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
272. See Wiener, 357 U.S. at 352, 356 (recounting Humphrey's repudiation of Myers's
dicta and holding that the President lacked authority to remove a quasi-judicial member of
the War Claims Commission); Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 626-29 (finding that Congress
could protect officers exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers from
presidential removal and repudiating dicta in Myers to the extent inconsistent with its
opinion).
273. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the President's lack of "exclusive control" violates the Constitution in this case because
prosecution is a "purely executive power").
274. Of course, the Supreme Court has held that Congress may not delegate legislative
authority to anybody, even the President. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 537-38 (1935) (holding that the Congress may not delegate its legislative authority
to the President); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (holding that
Congress may not delegate its "essential legislative functions" to others). It permits,
however, delegation of quasi-legislative authority because of the difficulty of defining the
difference between executive and legislative authority. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (explaining that the Court has "'almost never felt
qualified to second-guess' congressional judgments about the degree of discretion to leave
agencies (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting))); Mistretta, 488 U.S at 371-79 (affirming delegation of power to a commission
to establish ranges of sentences for numerous federal crimes). Having permitted broad
delegation in practice, insisting on presidential control of that delegation would further erode
the principal of congressional control of legislation that justifies the nondelegation doctrine.
Cf Strauss, Agencies, supra note 15, at 637 (finding presidential rulemaking "problematic").
275. But see Mashaw, supra note 167, at 1301-02 (describing the early Republic as
employing the use of "Boards of Eminent Officers" to carry out various administrative
functions (emphasis omitted)).
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But the Framers only accepted a single "executive." This model need not
extend to quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions, where the
Constitution often employs models of collective decision making, as
exemplified by Congress and the Supreme Court.
Still, the validity of a piece of the unitary executive theory might raise
legitimate questions about legislation empowering a committee to carry out
battles or conduct foreign affairs. The duty-based theory does not deny that
the model of an energetic executive may require some limits on collective
decision making outside of Congress. But it generally affirms the validity
of independent agencies.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution requires that the law, not the President, control the
executive branch of government. To that end, it relies heavily on instilling
a duty to obey the law and chooses checks and balances over personal
control by a single individual and his faction.
